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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Justice William O. Douglas declared that judges
“do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation
nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the
1
public welfare.” Eight years before, the Minnesota Supreme Court
presaged Justice Douglas’s admonition in observing that “the
public policy of a state is for the legislature to determine and not
2
the courts.” More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court echoed
the warning, stating that “[t]his court will not substitute its
3
judgment for that of the legislature.” Similarly, a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency, even if
the court may have reached a different substantive conclusion than
4
the agency.
In Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy v. Minnesota
5
6
Pollution Control Agency (“Boise Cascade”), the Minnesota Court of
Appeals required the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(“MPCA”) to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”)
under the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) on the
7
expansion of a Boise Cascade Corporation paper mill.
By
requiring that MPCA conduct an EIS, the court of appeals
substituted its judgment for that of MPCA and the Minnesota
legislature. The decision also offered an unpersuasive distinction
of National Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
8
(“Potlatch”), a case that the court of appeals decided four years
earlier involving strikingly similar facts. Fortunately, the Minnesota
1. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
2. Mattson v. Flynn, 13 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn. 1944). See also In re Karger’s
Estate, 93 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. 1958) (opining that “[w]hat the law ought to
be is for the legislature; what the law is rests with the courts”).
3. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993).
4. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1988). See also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (providing that a court may
not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency”).
5. 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn.
2002).
6. Because Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control
Agency, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (hereinafter Boise Cascade) and
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997) (hereinafter Potlatch) involve the same named defendant (MPCA)
and a common plaintiff (the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy), this
article’s short form citations for the cases reference the names of the defendantintervenors.
7. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 238.
8. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Supreme Court recognized the intermediate appellate court’s
error, and on May 23, 2002, reversed the decision of the court of
9
appeals in Boise Cascade.
MEPA requires state or local governments to collect
information regarding the environmental effects of a project that
any governmental unit undertakes, permits, assists, finances,
regulates, or approves. For projects whose environmental effects
cannot be studied adequately on a case-by-case basis, the Minnesota
Environmental Quality Board (“EQB”) may conduct a so-called
“generic” environmental impact statement. In 1989, the EQB
determined that the cumulative effects of timber harvesting in
Minnesota could not be studied adequately in project-specific
environmental review, and ordered the preparation of the Generic
Environmental Impact Statement on Timber Harvesting and Forest
10
Management in Minnesota (“GEIS”). Completed in 1994, the
5000-page GEIS evaluated the cumulative environmental effects of
logging in Minnesota’s forests and recommended mitigation
measures to address those effects. In 1995, the Minnesota
legislature enacted the Sustainable Forest Resources Act (“SFRA”)
11
to implement the GEIS recommendations.
This article analyzes the challenges to MPCA’s application of
the GEIS in Potlatch and Boise Cascade. The article suggests that,
despite a few flaws in the opinion, the court of appeals in Potlatch
correctly upheld MPCA’s use of the GEIS and the decision not to
12
require a project-specific EIS. However, just four years later in
Boise Cascade, the court of appeals ignored Potlatch, legislative
policy, and the administrative record in holding that MPCA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in relying upon the GEIS and deciding
13
not to require a project-specific EIS. The Minnesota Supreme
Court properly reversed, but reached an erroneous conclusion
regarding the incorporation of timber harvesting mitigation
measures into MPCA permits. Justice Paul H. Anderson clarified
the issue but, in an otherwise cogent and persuasive concurring
opinion, incorrectly assumed that MPCA failed to rely upon the
implementation of such measures in reaching its decision on the
9.
10.

Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 459.
See JAAKKO POYRY CONSULTING, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT STUDY ON TIMBER HARVESTING AND FOREST M ANAGEMENT IN M INNESOTA 1
(1994) [hereinafter GEIS].
11. M INN. STAT. ch. 89A (2000).
12. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 219.
13. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
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14

need for an EIS. By reversing the court of appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Boise Cascade demonstrated appropriate
deference to MPCA, adhered to the Minnesota legislature’s intent
15
in enacting SFRA, and reaffirmed the analysis in Potlatch.
II. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, THE GENERIC EIS
ON TIMBER HARVESTING, AND THE SUSTAINABLE FOREST
RESOURCES ACT
A. MEPA Statutory and Regulatory Background
On May 19, 1973, four years after Congress passed the
16
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Minnesota
17
18
legislature enacted MEPA.
Modeled after NEPA, MEPA’s
purpose is “to force agencies to make their own impartial
evaluation of environmental considerations before reaching their
19
decisions” by requiring state and local governmental entities to
“use all practical means, consistent with other essential
20
considerations of state policy” to implement the statute’s policies.
14. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 469 (Anderson, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 467-68.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000). NEPA applies to the actions of federal
agencies. Id.
17. M INN. STAT. §§ 116D.01-.11 (2000).
18. See No Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312,
323 (Minn. 1977) (observing that MEPA is “[p]atterned on NEPA”). Minnesota
courts often rely upon federal case law decided under NEPA in construing MEPA.
See, e.g., id. at 323 n.28 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has relied upon
NEPA case law in interpreting MEPA); Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 237 N.W.2d 375, 380-81 (Minn. 1975) (relying in
part upon NEPA case law in holding that decisions regarding environmental
impact statements are subject to judicial review under MEPA); Iron Rangers Ridge
Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 881-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (terming
NEPA the “federal equivalent” of MEPA, and citing NEPA case law in analyzing
impacts and mitigation under MEPA).
19. No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at 327.
20. M INN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2 (2000). MEPA articulates nineteen broad
policy goals, including fulfilling “the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations,” preserving “important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain[ing],
wherever practicable, an environment that supports diversity, and variety of
individual choice,” and minimizing “wasteful and unnecessary depletion of
nonrenewable resources.” M INN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2(a), (d), (l) (2000).
Section 116D.02 is very similar to NEPA Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331. Although
NEPA Section 101 emphasizes important policy considerations, federal courts
have held that the provision does not establish enforceable standards of conduct
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21

MEPA applies to any “major governmental action” that may have
22
the potential for significant environmental effects. The EQB
promulgated regulations that implement MEPA’s environmental
23
review requirements. Under the statute and the EQB rules, a
and does not create a cause of action for failure to meet the goals described. See,
e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark.
1971) (“It is true that the Act require[s] the government ‘to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources,’ but it does not
purport to vest in the plaintiffs, or anyone else, a ‘right’ to the type of
environment envisioned therein.”), inj. dissolved and case dismissed 342 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff’d 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Bradford Township v. Ill.
State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048
(1972) (“The declarations of a national environmental policy and a statement of
purpose appearing in [NEPA] are not sufficient to establish substantive rights. For
these reasons, the plaintiffs have asserted no cognizable federal rights under these
statutes.”); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 534 (S.D. Tex. 1972)
(citing Envtl. Def. Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 755). Similarly, Minnesota courts have
rejected attempts to transform MEPA’s broad policy goals into substantive
standards or causes of action. See, e.g., In re NSP Red Wing Ash Disposal Facility,
421 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to imply from the broad
statements of purpose in MEPA a guarantee of a “meaningful hearing” when other
Minnesota regulations expressly provide the right to a contested case hearing);
Gleason v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, File No. MC 98-019439 (Hennepin County
Dist. Ct.) (dismissing challenge to environmental review under the goals set forth
in MEPA, M INN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency,
File No. C1-95-602306 (Cook County Dist. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996) (dismissing challenge
to environmental review under the goals set forth in MEPA, M INN. STAT. §
116D.03, subd. 2, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
21. M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000). A “governmental action” is an
activity, “including projects wholly or partially conducted, permitted, assisted,
financed, regulated, or approved by units of government including the federal
government.” Id. at subd. 1a(d); M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 33 (1999). A
“governmental unit” is “any state agency and any general or special purpose unit
of government in the state including, but not limited to, watershed districts . . . ,
counties, towns, cities, port authorities, housing authorities, and economic
development authorities . . . but not including courts, school districts, and
regional development commissions other than the metropolitan council.” M INN.
STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 1a(e) (2000); M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 34 (1999).
22. See M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000) (“[w]here there is potential
for significant environmental effects resulting from any major governmental
action, the action shall be proceeded by a detailed environmental impact
statement”). See also M INNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL Q UALITY BOARD, GUIDE TO
M INNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW
RULES
1
(1998),
available
at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/pdf/rulguid3.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2002)
(discussing MEPA requirements) [hereinafter EQB RULES GUIDE]. In short,
MEPA may apply if a project: (1) involves physical manipulation of the
environment; (2) will take place in the future; and (3) is conducted by, requires
the approval of, or receives financial assistance from a local, state, or federal
governmental unit. Id.
23. See M INN. R. ch. 4410 (1999).
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24

“responsible governmental unit” (“RGU”) discharges MEPA’s
prerequisites by preparing and evaluating environmental review
25
documents, and “complying with environmental review processes
26
in a timely manner.” An RGU is typically the government or
governmental agency with the largest role in approving or
27
supervising a project.
MEPA mandates that governmental entities prepare an EIS
where there is the potential for significant environmental effects
28
resulting from any major government action. The EQB rules
require an EIS for certain projects that, based upon location or
character, make the potential for significant environmental effects
highly likely. If a project meets or exceeds the so-called
“mandatory” EIS thresholds established in the EBQ rules, the
governmental entity serving as the RGU must prepare an EIS
29
before undertaking or approving the project. Even if a project
does not fall within a mandatory EIS category, an RGU must
prepare a so-called “discretionary” EIS if the proposed project has
30
the potential for significant environmental effects. The RGU
must consider four criteria in determining whether a project has
the potential for significant environmental effects: (1) the type,
extent, and reversibility of the effects; (2) the cumulative potential
effects of the project and related or anticipated future projects;
(3) the extent to which the effects are “subject to mitigation by
ongoing public regulatory authority”; and (4) the extent to which
other available environmental studies may anticipate and control
24. See M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 1a(e) (2000) (defining “governmental
unit” as “any state agency and any general or special purpose unit of government
in the state including, but not limited to, watershed districts organized under
chapter 103D, counties, towns, cities, port authorities, housing authorities, and
economic development authorities established under section 469.090 to 469.108,
but not including courts, school districts, and regional development commissions
other than the metropolitan council”); M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 75 (defining
“responsible governmental unit”).
25. M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000); M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 75
(1999).
26. M INN. R. 4410.0400, subp. 2 (1999).
27. M INNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL Q UALITY BOARD, EAW GUIDELINES: PREPARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS 1 (2000).
28. M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000); M INN. R. 4410.0200, subps. 1, 3
(1999).
29. See M INN. R. 4410.2000, subp. 2 (1999) (stating that an RGU must prepare
an EIS for projects meeting or exceeding the thresholds established in M INN. R.
4410.4400) and M INN. R. 4410.4400 (1999) (establishing mandatory EIS categories
and the RGU for each mandatory category).
30. M INN. R. 4410.2000, subp. 3(A)-(B) (1999).
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31

the environmental effects of the proposed project.
Governmental entities consider whether a project has the
potential for significant environmental effects by preparing an
32
environmental assessment worksheet (“EAW”). If a proposed
project meets or exceeds certain thresholds established in the EQB
33
rules, an RGU must prepare an EAW; if not, an RGU may prepare
an EAW if the proposed project “may have the potential for
34
significant environmental effects.” Ostensibly a “brief document
prepared in worksheet format which is designed to rapidly assess
35
the environmental effects” associated with a proposal, an EAW for
36
a complex project may include hundreds of pages of analysis.
If a project’s environmental effects are not subject to adequate
review on a case-by-case basis, the EQB may order preparation of a
37
generic EIS. Among the criteria for determining whether a
generic EIS is necessary are the regional and statewide significance
of a project’s environmental effects, and the degree to which
38
project-specific review is able to address such effects. Because
traditional project-specific environmental review has limitations in

31. M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(A)-(D) (1999).
32. See M INN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 1 (1999) (noting that the purpose of an
EAW is to “aid in the determination of whether an EIS is needed for a proposed
project” and to “serve as a basis to begin the scoping process for an EIS” if one is
necessary). See also M INN. R. 4410.2100, subp. 2(A)-(B) (1999) (for projects that
do not fall within the mandatory EIS categories, an EAW serves “to identify the
need for preparing an EIS pursuant to part 4410.1700” and “to initiate discussion
concerning the scope of the EIS if an EIS is ordered pursuant to part 4410.1700”).
33. See M INN. R. 4410.4300 (1999) (establishing mandatory EAW categories
and the RGU for each mandatory category). The legislature may also expressly
require an EAW for a project, even though the project does not meet or exceed a
mandatory EAW threshold under Minnesota Rule 4410.4300 (1999). See In re Am.
Iron & Supply Co., 604 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the
Minnesota legislature passed a statute requiring that MPCA conduct an EAW on a
metal shredding facility to determine whether an EIS was necessary).
34. M INN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 3 (1999). A group of at least twenty-five
citizens may also petition the EQB for an EAW. M INN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 1
(1999). The petition must include “material evidence indicating that, because of
the nature or location of the proposed project, there may be a potential for
significant environmental effects.” M INN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 2(E) (1999). If the
EQB determines that the petition complies with process requirements, it forwards
the petition to the RGU. M INN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 5 (1999). The RGU then
decides whether to conduct an EAW. M INN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 6 (1999).
35. M INN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 1 (1999).
36. See, e.g., Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 459-60 (noting that the EAW
involved was well over 100 pages).
37. M INN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 1 (1999).
38. M INN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 5(H) (1999).
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evaluating widespread cumulative environmental effects, a generic
EIS is often a better instrument to address effects of regional or
39
statewide concern. Although preparation of a generic EIS does
not exempt particular proposals from MEPA’s procedural
requirements, an RGU must use information from a generic EIS in
40
conducting project-specific environmental review. So long as the
EQB “determines that the generic EIS remains adequate at the
time the specific project is subject to review,” an environmental
review document for a project related to the subject matter of the
generic EIS “shall use the information in the generic EIS by tiering
and shall reflect the recommendations contained in the generic
41
EIS.”
The EQB rules also exempt specific projects from
42
environmental review. For all projects other than “government
activities”—which are defined as “[p]roposals and enactments of
43
the legislature”—the exemption is qualified. Accordingly, if an
otherwise exempt project meets or exceeds any of the thresholds
44
for a mandatory EAW or EIS, the exemption does not apply. If
the legislature exempts a proposed project, however, the project is
not subject to environmental review even if it meets or exceeds the
45
thresholds for a mandatory EAW or EIS.
Judicial review of an RGU’s decision on the need for an EAW,
the need for an EIS, and the adequacy of an EIS is available by a
declaratory judgment action commenced within thirty days of the
46
decision. Venue is in the district court of the county where the
39. EQB RULES GUIDE, supra note 22, at 5.
40. M INN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 8 (1999).
41. Id. “Tiering” means “incorporating by reference the discussion of an
issue from a broader or more generic EIS.” M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 88 (1999).
42. See generally M INN. R. 4410.4600, subps. 1-26 (1999) (listing exempt
projects).
43. M INN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 26 (1999).
44. M INN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 1 (1999). See Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v.
Big Stone County Bd. of Comm’rs, 638 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that an EIS was mandatory under M INN. R. 4410.4400, subp. 20 because a
project eliminated a protected wetland, and as such could not qualify for the
routine ditch maintenance and repair exception in M INN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 17).
45. See M INN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 1 (1999) (noting that the limitation to the
exemption does not apply to subpart 26, the “governmental activities” exemption).
See also State v. Minn. Dept. of Natural Res., No. CX-93-2435, 1994 WL 193758 at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1994) (holding that the phrase “notwithstanding . . .
any other law to the contrary” in directing a sale of state land exempted the sale
from MEPA environmental review under M INN. R. 4410.4600, supb. 26).
46. M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 10 (2000). MEPA, M INN. STAT. § 116D.04,
subd. 10 (2000), specifically grants EQB the right to initiate judicial review of

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/13

8

Lightfoot: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Minnesota Timber Harvesting
FINAL L IGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 10:51 PM

THE MINNESOTA TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS

445

47

proposed project would be undertaken. In reviewing decisions of
administrative agencies under MEPA on the need for an EAW, the
need for an EIS, and the adequacy of an EIS, Minnesota courts
examine whether substantial evidence in the administrative record
supports the decisions, and whether the decisions are arbitrary or
48
capricious. MEPA also provides that “any person” may bring an
action against the EQB or other unit of government failing to
undertake aspects of the environmental review process within the
time specified under the statute, such as the statutory
49
50
requirement for completing an EIS within 280 days.
B. The Generic EIS on Timber Harvesting and Forest Management in
51
Minnesota
Between 1980 and 1994, the level of timber harvesting in
Minnesota increased from 2.3 million cords annually to 4.1 million
52
cords annually. Spurred by the growth in harvest levels, a group
decisions referred to in the section, and to intervene as of right in any proceeding
brought under subdivision 10. Aside from the EQB, Section 116D.04, subd. 10
does not state who may bring an action under the section. However, the language
of subdivision 10 authorizing the EQB to “intervene as of right in any proceeding
brought under this subdivision” suggests that parties other than the EQB may file
actions under Section 116D.04, subd. 10. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 (applying the standards of review
codified in the Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act, M INN. STAT. § 14.69, in
reviewing a decision on the need for an EIS under MEPA).
49. See M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 11 (2000). In addition to the two private
rights of action discussed above, M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 13 (2000),
establishes the manner in which the EQB may bring actions to enforce MEPA.
Unlike M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 10 (2000), subdivision 13 does not contain a
statement authorizing the EQB to intervene as of right. The absence of an express
right of intervention for EQB demonstrates that subdivision 13 is limited to EQB
enforcement actions and does not allow private parties to bring an action under
the subdivision.
50. See M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000) (requiring that an EIS be
prepared within 280 days after notice of its preparation, unless the governor or the
parties extend the time for good cause).
51. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the entire Final
Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Timber Harvesting and Forest
Management in Minnesota. This section, which generally describes the framework
and conclusions of the study, is intended to provide the background and context
necessary for an understanding of the Potlatch and Boise Cascade decisions.
52. M INNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, MINNESOTA M ILESTONES 2002:
M EASURES
THAT
M ATTER,
Indicator
60
(Timber
Harvest)
at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/mm/indicator.html?Id=60&G=39 (last visited
Aug. 6, 2002). Total timber harvest has been stable since 1995, fluctuating slightly
between 3.7 and 3.8 million cords per year. According to the Minnesota
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of citizens in July 1989 petitioned the EQB to conduct a generic
environmental impact statement that would examine the statewide
53
effects of timber harvesting and forest management. Minnesota’s
project-based environmental review process under MEPA, the
petitioners argued, could not adequately evaluate the cumulative
54
environmental effects of increased timber harvesting. The EQB
55
agreed.
In December 1989, the EQB unanimously passed a
resolution directing the preparation of a timber harvesting and
56
forest management generic environmental impact statement, and
selected Jaakko Poyry Consulting, Inc. of Tarrytown, New York to
57
conduct the study.
When published in April 1994, the timber harvesting GEIS was
unprecedented in the history of environmental impact statements
in Minnesota. The 5000-page study, which includes nine technical
58
papers and five background papers, took over four years to
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), “[t]he drop in the timber harvest in
1995 reflects an adjustment based on decreased use of firewood since 1989 and
1990.” Id.
53. GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-4.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217-18 (“The GEIS was requested by
the Environmental Quality Board because the effects of timber harvesting within
the state could not be adequately analyzed on a case-by-case, project-specific basis.
This is, in part, because it is not possible to identify the specific areas or stands of
timber that will be harvested and because the ownership of Minnesota’s available
timberland is divided among a wide variety of groups and individuals.”); EQB
RULES GUIDE, supra note 22, at 5 (the potential for cumulative impact from a
variety of specific projects “was one of the chief reasons why the EQB prepared a
Generic EIS on timber harvesting activities”).
56. GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-4.
57. According to the GEIS, Jaakko Poyry Consulting, Inc., is a member of the
Jaakko Poyry Group, “the world’s leading independent consulting and
engineering organization specializing in forestry and forest industry
development.” GEIS, supra note 10, at liii. Established in 1958 and headquartered
in Helsinki, Finland, the Jaakko Poyry Group at the time it completed the GEIS
employed nearly 6,000 people in over twenty countries. Id. The Group “has a
worldwide reputation as advisor to forest industries, national governments, and
international agencies,” with particular expertise “in conducting environmental
impact assessments and environmentally-based development plans for a region,
based upon an objective, analytical, and comprehensive approach that includes
estimating the economic impact of the recommendations.” Id.
58. As the GEIS acknowledges, the first step in undertaking such a study is to
“identify and define the issues to be addressed,” a process known as “scoping”
under MEPA. Id. at 1-6. In early 1990, the GEIS Advisory Committee, see infra
note 61 and accompanying text, developed a draft report specifying the issues that
the GEIS would address. GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-6. The EQB issued the report
as a draft scoping document in July 1990, and solicited public comments. Id.
After receiving public comments and further recommendations from the Advisory
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59

complete and cost the state of Minnesota $875,000. In addition to
the consulting resources of Jaakko Poyry, more than sixty scientists
60
in twenty disciplines prepared the GEIS. A ten-person advisory
committee, representing economic development, environmental,
conservation, tourism, and public land management interests,
provided direction and oversight throughout the GEIS study
61
process.
As the EQB directed, the GEIS analyzed and evaluated the
potential significant environmental effects of three annual
statewide timber harvest levels. The first was the “base” scenario of
four million cords, which the EQB selected because it was the level
of the statewide timber harvest in 1990—the most recent year of
62
available data when the state prepared the GEIS. The second or
“medium” scenario assumed an annual harvest of 4.9 million cords,
which was the level of the statewide timber harvest that the GEIS
estimated would occur by 1995 if certain announced forest
63
products industry expansions occurred. The third or “high”
Committee, the EQB approved a final scoping decision for the GEIS in December
1990. Id. The nine technical papers addressed major issues that the final scoping
document required the GEIS to analyze: (1) Maintaining Productivity and the Forest
Resource Base; (2) Forest Soils; (3) Forest Health; (4) Water Quality and Fisheries; (5)
Biodiversity; (6) Wildlife; (7) Unique Historical and Cultural Resources; (8) Economics
and Management Issues; and (9) Recreation and Aesthetics. Id. at 1-9 to 1-12, 2-27 to 244. For each issue, the technical papers provide a comprehensive record of the
topics evaluated, assessment methodologies employed, and conclusions drawn
regarding the subject matter. Id. at 2-28. Two of the five background papers,
Global Atmospheric Change and Recycled Fiber Opportunities, address factors identified
in the EQB’s final scoping decision. Id. at 2-44 to 2-45. Three others, Public
Forestry Organizations and Policies, Harvesting Systems, and Silvicultural Systems, provide
background information on forest management and timber harvesting in
Minnesota. Id. at 2-45. The GEIS integrates the conclusions drawn from the nine
technical papers and the five background papers. Id. at 2-28.
59. Id. at 1-5 to 1-6.
60. Id. at liii-liv; 2-1 to 2-6.
61. See id. at 1-5 (noting that the total cost was divided among several public
and private sources). The EQB requested that the Advisory Committee advise the
EQB on the scope of the GEIS and the selection of the consultant to prepare the
GEIS. Id. In addition, the EQB asked the Advisory Committee to review and
comment on the consultant’s reports, the proposed draft GEIS, and the final
GEIS. Id. Finally, the EQB directed the Advisory Committee to provide
recommendations on alternatives for mitigating significant environmental impacts
identified in the GEIS. Id.
62. Id. at ii.
63. Id. In fact, the annual timber harvest in Minnesota has yet to approach
the level of 4.9 million cords. See supra note 52. Annual timber harvest in the state
peaked at 4.1 million cords in 1993 and 1994. See supra text accompanying note
52. Since 1995, total timber harvest has been stable, fluctuating slightly between
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scenario assumed an annual timber harvest of seven million cords,
which the GEIS estimated was the maximum sustainable annual
timber volume available for statewide harvest for all tree species in
64
the year 2000. As the GEIS emphasized, the scenarios “are not
recommended levels of harvest nor should their development and analysis be
considered a plan[;]” they were simply “levels the study was asked to
analyze to determine what the impacts would be if these harvests were to
65
occur.”
Modeling for each scenario predicted the “spatial and
temporal distribution” of timber harvesting by species that might
occur throughout the state during the fifty-year planning horizon
66
of the GEIS. The “primary data input” for modeling the three
scenarios was the United States Forest Service’s Forestry Inventory
and Analysis (“FIA”) database, which consists of nearly 14,000 one67
acre plots in forests throughout the state. After using the FIA
information to map timber resources, the GEIS employed
computer models to assess projected timber harvests for the base,
68
medium, and high levels, and to evaluate environmental effects.
The GEIS then divided the state into seven areas called
“ecoregions,” and evaluated the cumulative statewide effects for
69
each level of timber harvest by ecoregion. According to the GEIS,
logging would occur in virtually all forested regions of the state,
because Minnesota has a well-developed road network and a
70
decentralized timber industry.
For the base scenario, the GEIS identified seventeen types of
environmental effects by ecoregion across the state. The effects
included the projected significant loss of forest in four ecoregions,
changes to the tree species mix that could affect biodiversity and
wildlife habitat, accelerated erosion from forest roads, changes in
3.7 and 3.8 million cords per year. See supra note 52.
64. GEIS, supra note 10 at ii. The high scenario was the maximum level of
harvesting that the GEIS estimated the state could sustain from a timber
production perspective only. Id. at xxix. The GEIS did not evaluate the high
scenario as a feasible level of statewide timber harvest. Id. Rather, the GEIS
employed the level as an analytical tool and concluded that, even “with the
assumptions and constraints [of the study] applied, this level is not achievable on a
sustainable basis.” Id.
65. Id. at ii.
66. Id. The fifty-year period spanned the years 1990 through 2040. Id. at iii.
67. Id. at ii.
68. Id. at iii.
69. Id. at vi.
70. Id. at xxi.
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the population of certain forest-dependent wildlife, and the
development of permanent forest roads in otherwise undeveloped
71
areas. For the medium and high scenarios, the GEIS concluded
that the cumulative effects would be of the same type as the base
scenario, but the degree of the effects would be more
72
pronounced. “In particular,” the GEIS stated, “the high scenario
73
suggests many impacts are large and would be left unmitigated.”
To address the identified environmental effects, the GEIS
recommended implementation of three categories of mitigation
strategies. The first category was “site-level” responses, intended to
modify the procedures used in timber harvesting and forest
management on individual parcels. These mitigation measures
included adjusting harvest practices and equipment, altering
silvicultural practices, protecting sensitive sites, and increasing
74
forest productivity. The second category was “landscape-level”
measures requiring long-term solutions on a regional or statewide
level. These measures involved reducing the area of forest
converted to other land uses, safeguarding sensitive sites for plant
species, and developing logging approaches in areas near bodies of
75
water.
The final category of mitigation was instituting forest
resources research designed to obtain information necessary to
undertake planning efforts, to monitor site-level and landscapelevel changes resulting from logging, and to provide forest
76
management and planning tools.
After discussing mitigation measures, the GEIS concluded that
the four million cord base annual harvest scenario was “sustainable
in a broad sense” and could continue “indefinitely” while
77
maintaining other forest resource characteristics. The only caveat
was that the state needed to implement the recommended
mitigation strategies “within the next few years” for the base level
78
harvest scenario to be sustainable. Similarly, the 4.9 million cord
medium annual harvest scenario was “sustainable in the long-term”
if the recommended mitigation was implemented “relatively soon”

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at xxi-xxiii.
Id. at xxvii.
Id.
Id. at xxiii-xxiv.
Id. at xxiv-xxv.
Id. at xxv-xxvi.
Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
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within the fifty-year planning horizon of the GEIS. Finally, the
GEIS concluded that a harvest level of up to 5.5 million cords
annually was sustainable without adversely affecting the state’s
forests if “the loss of forest land projected in the north was halted,
and substantial investments in forest management are made to
80
improve productivity.” The GEIS warned, however, that this
conclusion assumed that “the site-specific or other mitigations
below the modeled level of resolution are implemented within the
81
next few years and do mitigate otherwise significant impacts.”
Reaching such harvest levels might also require the United States
Forest Service to increase the “allowable sale quantities on the two
82
national forests in Minnesota.”
In addition to mitigation strategies, the GEIS endorsed four
“strategic
programmatic
responses”
offering
policy
recommendations to implement the proposed mitigation measures
83
and to evaluate their efficacy. According to the GEIS, the state
should first establish a “comprehensive Forest Resources Practices
Program” that would serve as “an umbrella structure” for
implementation of specific guidelines to mitigate the
environmental effects of timber harvesting that the GEIS
84
identified.
Second, the GEIS recommended a statewide
“Sustainable Forest Resources Program” that “transcend[s]
ownership boundaries” to successfully mitigate “unacceptable
landscape-level impacts from timber harvesting and forest
85
management activities.” Third, the GEIS encouraged a forest
resources research program to fill information gaps identified in
the GEIS process, and to develop the information “needed to fully
mitigate the projected timber harvesting and forest management
86
significant impacts.” Finally, the GEIS advocated formation “in
advance of the other policy initiatives” of a Minnesota Board of
87
Forest Resources. The board would be “the most appropriate
administrative structure for implementing these [programmatic]

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at xxviii.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xxix.
Id. at xxix-xxxiii.
Id. at xxix-xxx.
Id. at xxx-xxxi.
Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
Id. at xxxiii.
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88

initiatives.”

C. SFRA Statutory Background
In 1995, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Sustainable
89
Forest Resources Act (“SFRA”) to implement the GEIS
90
recommendations. SFRA established a seventeen member Forest
Resources Council, with the governor appointing the chair and
91
fifteen members. The statute charges the council with developing
recommendations to the governor and to federal, state, and local
governments regarding forest management practices that will result
92
in sustainable use and protection of the state’s forest resources.
More importantly, SFRA mandates that the Council develop
guidelines that address the environmental effects of timber
93
harvesting by applying “site-level” forestry practices based upon
94
“the best available scientific information.” Although the Council’s
timber harvesting and forest management guidelines are
95
voluntary, SFRA requires DNR to monitor silvicultural practices
and compliance with the timber harvesting guidelines “at the
96
statewide, landscape, and site levels.” DNR must also oversee
88. Id. at xxxii-xxxiii.
89. M INN. STAT. ch. 89A (2000).
90. See Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 463 (“In response to the Forestry GEIS,
the Minnesota legislature enacted the Sustainable Forest Resources Act.”).
91. M INN. STAT. § 89A.03, subd. 1 (2000). The Indian affairs council appoints
the seventeenth member. Id. The members appointed by the governor must
include a variety of representatives, including two persons representing
environmental groups, two non-industrial private forest land owners, and a
representative from DNR, a conservation organization, the forest products
industry, a logging contractor, the tourism industry, a county land commissioner, a
higher educational institution, the United States Forest Service, a game species
management organization, a labor organization, and a secondary wood products
manufacturer. Id. As originally enacted, SFRA established a thirteen member
council appointed by the governor only. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 80. In 1998,
the legislature amended the statute to add an appointment by the Indian affairs
council. 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 401, § 30. The next year, the legislature amended
the statute to read as currently codified. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 116.
92. M INN. STAT. § 89A.03, subd. 2 (2000).
93. SFRA defines “site-level” as “efforts affecting operational procedures used
in the planning and implementation of timber harvesting and forest management
activities on an individual site or local scale.” M INN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 12
(2000).
94. M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 1 (2000).
95. Id. at subd. 3.
96. M INN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 2 (2000).
“Landscape” refers to a
“heterogeneous land area composed of interacting sustainable forest resources
that are defined by natural features and socially defined attributes.” M INN. STAT.
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broad trends and conditions in the state’s forests and provide such
97
information to the Council. The statute mandates that DNR
evaluate the effectiveness of practices to mitigate the
98
environmental effects of logging on the state’s forest resources.
These provisions ensure that DNR, a state agency with ongoing
regulatory authority, monitors compliance with and the
effectiveness of the Council’s forest management guidelines.
In addition to DNR monitoring, SFRA requires the Council to
99
monitor implementation of the guidelines. Should the DNR
monitoring or other information indicate that the guidelines are
not being met or that “significant adverse impacts are occurring,”
the Council must recommend to the governor additional measures
100
to address the adverse effects. The statute also creates a forest
resources partnership of forest landowners, forest managers, and
loggers
charged
with
implementing
the
Council’s
recommendations “in a timely and coordinated manner across
101
ownerships.”
102
SFRA addresses landscape-level effects by requiring the
Council to develop long-range strategic planning and coordination
of forests owned by all levels of government, as well as industry and
103
private individuals.
To assist such planning, the statute
104
authorizes the Council to establish regional committees.
The
Council created eight regional landscape committees, each
105
representing a different area of the state.
The regional
106
committees must report their accomplishments to the Council.
§ 89A.01, subd. 9 (2000).
97. M INN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 1 (2000).
98. M INN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 3 (2000).
99. M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 3 (2000).
100. Id.
101. M INN. STAT. § 89A.04 (2000).
102. “Landscape-level” as used in the GEIS and SFRA means “typically longterm or broad-based efforts that may require extensive analysis or planning over
large areas that may involve or require coordination across land ownerships.”
M INN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 10 (2000). “Landscape-level” contrasts with “sitelevel,” which refers to effects from timber harvesting and forest management
activities on an individual site or local scale. M INN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 12
(2000).
103. M INN. STAT. § 89A.06 (2000).
104. Id. at § 89A.06, subd. 2 (2000).
105. See
Minnesota
Forest
Resources
Council
website
at
http://www.frc.state.mn.us/Landscp/Landscape.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
106. M INN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 4. As originally enacted, SFRA did not specify
reporting or action deadlines for the regional committees. 1995 Minn. Laws ch.
220, § 83. In the 1999 reauthorization, the Minnesota legislature added such
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When originally enacted in 1995, SFRA was to expire on June
107
30, 1999.
In 1999 the legislature reauthorized the statute
108
through June 30, 2001, and in 2001 the legislature extended the
109
sunset date through June 30, 2007. The 1999 reauthorization
also contained several provisions that responded to the Council’s
site-level forest management guidelines, adopted in December
110
1998 and published in February 1999. The technical teams that
developed the guidelines reached consensus on measures
addressing forest soils, wildlife habitat, and preservation of historic
111
and cultural resources. The team preparing the riparian zone
112
management guidelines, however, reached a “near consensus”
deadlines. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 119, codified at M INN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd.
2a. The Council met these deadlines. See M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL,
SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 1999: ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 13-14 (2000) (Council completed work for the
northeast landscape region by December 1, 1999, as required by M INN. STAT.
§ 89A.06, subd. 2a(1)); M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE
FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2000: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 13 (2001) (Council completed assessments for the
north central and southeast landscape regions by July 2001, as required by M INN.
STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a(2)); M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE
FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 7 (2002) (Council completed draft desired forest
conditions, goals, and strategies for the northeast and north central regions by July
1, 2001, as required M INN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a(3)). In 2001, the legislature
amended SFRA to require that all regional committees complete their landscape
assessments by June 30, 2002, and that the Council develop “desired future
outcomes and strategies” for all regions except the metropolitan and prairie
regions by June 30, 2003. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, § 102 (codified at
M INN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a (Supp. 2001)). The Council completed six
regional landscape assessments by June 2001, and is compiling assessments for the
metropolitan and prairie regions.
M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL,
SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE
GOVERNOR
AND
LEGISLATURE
7
(2002)
at
http://www.frc.state.mn.us/info/mfrcdocs.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
107. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 142.
108. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 191.
109. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Special Sess. ch. 2, § 151.
110. M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINING M INNESOTA FOREST
RESOURCES: VOLUNTARY SITE-LEVEL FOREST M ANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
LANDOWNERS, LOGGERS AND RESOURCE M ANAGERS (1999) [hereinafter COUNCIL
GUIDELINES].
111. See http://www.frc.state.mn.us/Fmgdline/Guidelines.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2002). Technical team members included representatives from federal
and state agencies, county land departments, universities, the forest industry,
Native American tribes, loggers, conservation groups, environmental
organizations, the tourism and recreation industry, private landowners, and utility
companies. Id.
112. “Riparian” areas or zones are areas of land and water that form a
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because two of the team’s twenty members did not concur with the
113
proposed guidelines.
In the 1999 SFRA reauthorization, the
legislature mandated that the riparian area guidelines undergo
114
peer review by December 1999. The Council met the deadline,
and is using information from the peer review process in
determining whether the riparian management zone guidelines
115
need revision.
In addition, the 1999 reauthorization requires DNR to
accelerate monitoring of the extent and condition of riparian
forests and the effectiveness of the guidelines in riparian
116
management zones. The Council must also review and update
117
the site-level forest management guidelines by June 30, 2003.
When reviewing the guidelines, the Council must consider
information from the monitoring that DNR conducts under SFRA,
and must subject any recommended revisions to peer review before
118
adopting revised guidelines. Finally, the legislature directed the
Council to establish processes in addition to Minnesota’s open
119
meeting law in order to “broaden public involvement in all
120
aspects of [the Council’s] deliberations.”
To comply with the 1999 SFRA reauthorization, the Council
approved a guideline review process in September 2001 and
121
requested public comment on the need for revisions. Council
staff then identified potential guideline modifications based upon
transition “from aquatic to terrestrial ecosystems along streams, lakes and open
water wetlands.” COUNCIL GUIDELINES, Riparian Areas, supra note 110, at 3.
113. Id.
114. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118 (codified as amended at M INN. STAT. §
89A.05, subd. 1 (2000)). The amended statute defined “peer review” as “a
scientifically based review conducted by individuals with substantial knowledge
and experience in the subject matter.” 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 114 (codified
as amended at M INN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 10a (2000)).
115. M INNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES
ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE
15 (2002) [hereinafter COUNCIL’ S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT].
116. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118, codified at M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 4
(2000) (requiring DNR to report to the legislature by February 2001 on the extent
and condition of riparian forests).
117. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118 (codified at M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 1
(2000)).
118. Id. (codified at M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 2a (2000)).
119. M INN. STAT. § 471.705 (1996) (codified as amended at M INN. STAT.
§§ 13D.01-.07 (2000)).
120. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 116 (codified as amended at M INN. STAT.
§ 89A.03, subd. 3 (2000)).
121. COUNCIL’ S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 15.
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the results of compliance and efficacy monitoring under SFRA, as
122
well as the riparian management zone guideline peer review.
The Council weighed the public comments and staff
recommendations in early 2002 and expects to approve any revised
123
guidelines by May 2003. In addition, as the 1999 reauthorization
124
required, DNR submitted to the legislature in March 2001 an
125
initial evaluation of riparian areas in Minnesota.
III. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS PROPERLY APPLIED—POTLATCH,
THE EQB, AND THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IN BOISE CASCADE
A. The Potlatch Case
1. Background
The first case to construe the GEIS as applied to a specific
126
project was the Potlatch case.
In Potlatch, the St. Louis County
District Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied an
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in reviewing an EAW that
MPCA prepared for expansion of a Potlatch Corporation wood
127
products facility. Both courts held that MPCA reasonably relied
upon the GEIS in determining that a project-specific EIS was
128
unnecessary under MEPA.
Potlatch involved the expansion of a plant near Cook,
129
Minnesota, that manufactured oriented strand board. In June
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
M INNESOTA DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, RIPARIAN FORESTS IN
M INNESOTA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (2001). In June 2002, DNR submitted
another report to the legislature that estimated timber harvest in riparian areas by
using sophisticated satellite imagery in combination with aerial photography. See
COUNCIL’ S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 10-15.
126. 569 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). The author represented
defendant-intervenor Potlatch Corporation in the litigation.
127. Id. at 215-16, 217.
128. Id. at 217-18.
129. “Oriented strand board” is a sheeting product used in the building
industry manufactured from wood flakes. At the Potlatch facility, tree-length
timber is cut into 100-inch logs and the bark is removed. The wood is then shaved
into thin stands approximately ¾-inch wide by three inches long. Potlatch mixes
the strands with resins and wax in a blending drum, places or “orients” the strands
onto sheets in layers to form a mat, presses the mats to a predetermined thickness
in a high-temperature press, cuts the pressed board into finished sizes, and
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1995, Potlatch Corporation sought approval from MPCA to expand
the facility and roughly double production, enabling the facility to
130
process an additional 177,000 cords of wood annually. Potlatch
Corporation estimated that ninety percent of the wood for the
proposed expansion was available within a 150-mile radius from the
Cook facility, which included the counties of Itasca, Koochiching,
131
Lake, and St. Louis.
Potlatch Corporation applied for an
amendment to the Cook facility’s Clean Air Act emissions permit to
reflect the expansion and MPCA, as the RGU under MEPA,
132
prepared an EAW for the project.
During the EAW process,
MPCA requested the assistance of the Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources (“DNR”) in reviewing timber harvesting issues,
and in preparing responses to comments on the EAW related to
133
forestry and wildlife management.
packages the product for shipment. MPCA, Environmental Assessment Worksheet
for Potlatch Oriented Strand Board Plant Expansion, Cook, Minnesota, at 2-3 (July
26, 1995) [hereinafter Potlatch EAW] (Appellants’ Appendix at A-150 to A-151,
Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
130. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. See also Potlatch EAW at 3 (Appellants’
Appendix at A-151, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97391)).
131. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. See also Potlatch EAW, Appendix 1 at 3
(Appellants’ Appendix at A-182, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. C5-97-391)). Although Potlatch’s Resource Availability Study determined
that wood for the expansion was available within a 150-mile radius, Potlatch
Corporation often procured wood from Canada, Wisconsin, and locations in
Minnesota well outside the 150-mile radius from the Cook facility. Potlatch
Minnesota Wood Products Division, Cook OSB Plant Expansion, Resource
Availability Study, at 14-15 (Respondent’s Appendix at A-158-59, Potlatch, 569
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)). Given the dynamic nature of
the wood market, only general assumptions are possible regarding where timber
harvesting might occur. As Gerald Rose, DNR’s Directory of Forestry, testified
before the MPCA Citizen’s Board when it considered the Potlatch EAW, “wood
procurement is very dynamic in the State of Minnesota and an increase in
consumption in a given local[e] will spread throughout the state; in other words, if
somebody can pay more, the market will determine where the wood will come
from.” Transcript of MPCA Citizen’s Board Meeting, Nov. 28, 1995, at 17
(Respondent’s Appendix at A-25, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. C5-97-391)).
132. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. The EQB’s environmental review rules
required MPCA to prepare an EAW because the project was predicted to increase
the generation of a regulated air pollutant emitted by the expanded Potlatch
facility by 100 tons or more per year. See M INN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 2 (1999) and
M INN. R. 4410.4300, subp. 15.A (1999). For such projects, the EQB rules specify
that MPCA is the RGU. M INN. R. 4410.4300, subp. 15.A (1999).
133. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. The Potlatch court made a factual error in
stating that MPCA “delegated” its responsibility for evaluating the effects of
increased timber harvesting to DNR. See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying
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MPCA, with DNR’s assistance, prepared a thirty-one page EAW
and a nineteen-page appendix. The EAW focused on analyzing the
effects of the increased wood harvest associated with the Potlatch
134
expansion. In July 1995, as required by the environmental review
135
136
rules, MPCA solicited public comments on the EAW. MPCA
received twenty-seven comments, most addressed to timber
harvesting issues, from private citizens, environmental groups, and
137
government agencies.
At the request of MPCA, the DNR
prepared a thirty-six page response to comments directed at the
138
Potlatch project’s effects on the state’s forests.
MPCA then
reviewed all of the information gathered in the EAW process,
including the GEIS, to assess whether the Potlatch project had “the
potential for significant environmental effects” and required an
139
EIS.
On November 28, 1995, the MPCA Citizen’s Board voted
eight-to-one not to require a project-specific EIS for the Potlatch
140
expansion.
Two weeks later, MPCA issued a modified air
emissions permit authorizing Potlatch Corporation to construct
141
and operate the expanded Cook facility.
2. Potlatch in the District Court
On December 22, 1995, four environmental groups, led by the
National Audubon Society, filed a four-count complaint against
142
MPCA in St. Louis County District Court. Count one alleged that
MPCA violated MEPA by failing to require an EIS for the Potlatch
143
Cook expansion project.
Count two alleged that the Potlatch
text.
134. Potlatch EAW at 2, 5, 20-22 and Appendix at 1-19 (Appellants’ Appendix
at A-150, A-153, A-168 to A-170, and A-180 to A-198, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
135. M INN. R. 4410.1500 , 4410.1600 (1993).
136. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214; Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 3, Potlatch, 569
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
137. Id.
138. Potlatch EAW Attachment 4, Comments and Responses on Timber
Harvest Issues (Appellants’ Appendix at A-199 to A-234, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
139. See M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 1 (1993) (“An EIS shall be ordered for
projects that have the potential for significant environmental effects.”).
140. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214-15; Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 4, Potlatch,
569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
141. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
142. Id.
143. In particular, count one alleged that MPCA violated M INN. STAT. §
116D.04, subd. 2a, which requires that “[w]here there is a potential for significant
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expansion would cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of
protected natural resources in Minnesota under MEPA. Count two
also maintained that such action and the existence of feasible
144
alternatives violated MEPA.
Count three asserted that MPCA
violated MEPA by failing to consider adequate protective measures
145
to mitigate the Potlatch expansion’s project-specific effects.
Count four alleged that the Potlatch expansion would cause
pollution, impairment, or destruction of protected natural
resources under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
146
147
(“MERA”), thereby violating MERA.
Potlatch Corporation
intervened, and MPCA and Potlatch then moved to dismiss counts
two, three, and four for failure to state a claim upon which relief
148
may be granted.
The district court granted the motion to
149
dismiss.
The parties then brought cross-motions for summary
environmental effects resulting from any major governmental action, the action
shall be preceded by a detailed environmental impact statement prepared by the
responsible governmental unit,” as well as M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a(A), 7(A),
which provide that an RGU must require an EIS if it determines information
regarding a project’s environmental effect is missing, and sets forth four criteria
for determining whether a project has the “potential for significant environmental
effects.” Complaint at ¶¶ 64-68, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control
Agency (Cook County Dist. Ct. 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
144. Id. at ¶¶ 69-72 (citing M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 4 for the “pollution,
impairment, or destruction of protected natural resources” and M INN. STAT.
§ 116D.04, subd. 6 for the “existence of feasible alternatives”).
145. Id. at ¶¶ 73-76 (citing M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2).
146. Id. at ¶ 78 (citing M INN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4, which defines
“[p]ollution, impairment or destruction” as “any conduct by any person which
violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule,
order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit . . . or any conduct which
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the
environment . . . .”).
147. Id. at ¶ 79 (citing M INN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1, which authorizes “any
person residing within the state” to bring a civil action in district court for
declaratory or equitable relief against any other person for “the protection of the
air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether
publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction . . . .”).
148. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
149. Potlatch, File No. C1-95-602306 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996).
With respect to count two, the district court held that environmental review did
not constitute a “state action” approving a project, and that plaintiffs did not have
a cause of action under MEPA, M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 6 (1994). The
district court also dismissed count three, holding that the goals set forth in MEPA,
M INN. STAT. § 116D.03, subd. 2 (1994), did not create a cause of action. The
district court dismissed count four because MPCA’s conduct of environmental
review under MEPA did not cause “pollution, impairment, or destruction” of the
state’s natural resources, and could not give rise to a MERA action under M INN.
STAT. § 116B.03 (1994).
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judgment on count one, which challenged MPCA’s decision not to
150
require an EIS for the Potlatch expansion project.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, MPCA argued
that it analyzed whether the Potlatch expansion required a projectspecific EIS based upon MEPA’s four criteria for determining the
151
“potential for significant environmental effects.” In particular,
MPCA maintained that the EAW and the GEIS fully addressed the
type of environmental effects associated with the Potlatch
152
expansion. MPCA also argued that the environmental effects of
the Potlatch expansion were subject to “mitigation by ongoing
public regulatory authority” because SFRA required the Forest
Resources Council, under the oversight of the DNR, to implement
153
the mitigation measures outlined in the GEIS. The GEIS, MPCA
contended, demonstrated that the effects of the Potlatch expansion
could be anticipated and controlled “as a result of other available
154
environmental studies.”
MPCA concluded that, under the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, the administrative
record provided substantial evidence to support its decision that
EAW and the GEIS adequately assessed the effects of increased
timber harvesting associated with the Potlatch expansion, and that
155
an EIS for the expansion project alone was unnecessary.
The environmental groups countered that MPCA
“systematically excluded adverse agency opinion” from the
administrative record, and that MPCA’s failure to consider the
objections of DNR’s Fish and Wildlife Division was arbitrary and
156
capricious. Documents that the environmental groups obtained
157
through the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act revealed
that although the DNR’s Forestry Division did not believe that the
Potlatch expansion warranted a project-specific EIS, the DNR’s Fish
158
and Wildlife Division did recommend an EIS for the project.
150. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
151. MPCA’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 13-21, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306). For the four criteria, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 13-15, referencing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(A), (B) (1993).
153. Id. at 16-18, referencing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (1993).
154. Id. at 18-19, referencing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(D) (1993).
155. Id. at 2-4, 19-21.
156. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-26,
Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306)(hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief).
157. M INN. STAT. ch. 13 (1994).
158. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 17-23. Plaintiffs initially sought discovery that included
internal DNR Division of Fish and Wildlife documents relating to the Potlatch
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Ultimately, the DNR Commissioner resolved the conflict, declared
DNR’s official position that the Potlatch project did not require an
EIS, and did not submit to MPCA the internal Forestry Division
159
documents drafted during the EAW process. The environmental
groups argued that (1) the MPCA “arbitrarily cut the DNR Division
160
of Fish and Wildlife out of the [Potlatch EAW] process;” (2) the
district court should consider the Fish and Wildlife Division’s
161
documents “excluded” from the administrative record; (3) the
GEIS mitigation measures relied upon in the Potlatch EAW were
162
voluntary and unimplemented; and (4) the GEIS did not
“anticipate” the effects of the Potlatch expansion, and thus could
163
not substitute for a project-specific EIS.
MPCA responded that when it decided a project-specific EIS
was unnecessary, the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division documents
were not in MPCA’s possession, and therefore were not part of the
164
administrative record. Moreover, MPCA contended that it was
not arbitrary and capricious for the agency to rely upon DNR’s
165
official position on the need for an EIS.
Furthermore, the
administrative record addressed all of the substantive objections
166
raised in the Fish and Wildlife Division documents. With respect
to mitigation, MPCA argued that many of the GEIS mitigation
strategies, which the state would implement under SFRA, would be
in place before construction of the Potlatch project. It further
argued that the GEIS envisioned mitigation could take years or

expansion. MPCA moved for a protective order, which the district court granted.
The district court held that discovery was available in challenges to administrative
decisions only where “there is a sufficient showing that there have been
procedural irregularities in the administrative proceeding or when the
administrative record is clearly inadequate,” and that plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate such irregularities or inadequacy. Potlatch, File No. C1-95-602306, at
4 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. June 14, 1996). MPCA, however, invited the plaintiffs
to request the DNR Division of Fish and Wildlife documents under the
Government Data Practices Act, and the plaintiffs obtained the documents directly
from DNR under the Act. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 7-8.
159. MPCA’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5-8, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306).
160. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 20.
161. Id. at 23-26.
162. Id. at 26-35.
163. Id. at 35-41.
164. MPCA’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4-8, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8-11.
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167

decades as the forests regenerated. MPCA also asserted that it
used the cumulative effects analysis in the GEIS precisely as the
168
GEIS drafters intended. According to MPCA, a project-specific
EIS would provide no additional information because it was
impossible to predict the exact location of logging associated with
the Potlatch project. Moreover, a project-specific EIS would rely
upon the same database as the GEIS to predict timber-harvesting
169
effects.
The district court granted MPCA’s summary judgment motion,
observing that “[p]laintiffs’ entire case rests upon the [DNR Fish
and Wildlife Division] documents submitted over objection which
170
are outside the administrative record.”
After spending
“considerable time” reviewing the documents, the court concluded
that they did not “show some sort of ‘record sanitizing’ by state
171
agencies in order to achieve a slanted and predictable result.”
MPCA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by relying upon
DNR’s official position, the court held, and “[t]he fact that there
was dissent within the DNR from that agency’s final decision does
172
not render the decision unlawful.” Although the district court
did not expressly address the mitigation issue, it opined that given
the “million-dollar GEIS was put together” to address the effects of
timber harvesting, “[s]till another study . . . with no real way of
173
making it site-specific, seems of little worth[.]”
Plaintiffs
174
appealed, correctly noting that the district court did not discuss
167. Id. at 21-32.
168. Id. at 11-20.
169. Id. The primary database for the GEIS was the United States Forest
Service’s Forest Inventory and Assessment (FIA) plots, a series of 13,536 one-acre
forest parcels randomly located throughout the state’s forests. See supra note 67
and accompanying text. MPCA argued that any EIS for the Potlatch expansion
“would require use of the same primary data inputs (i.e., FIA data) and modeling
technologies applied in the GEIS,” ensuring that “an EIS for the Potlatch
expansion project would essentially replicate the work of the GEIS and produce
similar, if not identical information on cumulative timber harvesting impacts.”
MPCA’s Response Brief at 18.
170. Findings and Order for Summary Judgment at 1, Potlatch, (St. Louis
County Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 2.
174. In addition to appealing the district court’s order granting MPCA
summary judgment on the claim regarding the need for an EIS, the
environmental groups appealed the district court’s decision to dismiss the claim
alleging that MPCA violated MERA. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court, holding that “MERA may not be used to seek
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the mitigation issue, but incorrectly asserting that the district court
“confined its review to the question of whether the MPCA compiled
a one-sided and self-serving account of the potential impacts of the
175
proposed expansion.”
3. Potlatch in the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the parties in Potlatch essentially reiterated the
arguments made before the district court in the cross-motions for
summary judgment. The environmental groups, relying upon their
primary argument in the district court, maintained that MPCA
excluded the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division’s objections to the
Potlatch EAW, thereby providing an administrative record that
“gave the public and the MPCA Citizens’ Board the illusion of
176
consensus.”
Although appellants’ public comments raised the
same issues found in the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division
documents, the environmental groups claimed that MPCA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to “inform agency decision
makers that the DNR, not just the general public, was deeply
177
divided on whether to recommend preparation of an EIS.” The
environmental groups also claimed that the SFRA mitigation
measures were illusory, voluntary, and could not constitute
178
“mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority” under MEPA.
Finally, the environmental groups suggested that MPCA used the
GEIS to “evade” project-specific review of the Potlatch expansion; a
project-specific EIS would provide “important new information”
and afford the state an opportunity to evaluate alternatives to the
179
expansion.
review of an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS, because MEPA is the
appropriate avenue for review of such decisions.” Id. at 219.
175. Statement of the Case of Appellants at 10, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391). Appellants maintained that “[o]n the
issue of whether the GEIS supplants the need for project-specific review, the
[district court] said nothing.” Id. In actuality, the district court explicitly stated
that given the GEIS, a project-specific EIS on timber harvesting “seems of little
worth[.]” Findings and Order for Summary Judgment at 2, Potlatch, (St. Louis
County Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
176. Appellants’ Brief at 20, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. C5-97-391).
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 32-39.
179. Id. at 39-46. As appellants noted, an EIS requires an examination of
alternatives to a proposed action, whereas an EAW does not. Id. at 46 (citing
MEPA, M INN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2(a) (1994)).
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In response, MPCA contended it reasonably relied upon
DNR’s official comments, and that those comments discussed the
issues regarding GEIS modeling and mitigation that the internal
180
Fish and Wildlife Division documents outlined.
MPCA also
maintained that the EAW identified ten potential environmental
effects related to timber harvesting associated with the Potlatch
expansion, and outlined specific mitigation measures to address
181
those effects.
In addition, MPCA argued that the Minnesota
legislature enacted SFRA in response to the GEIS, that SFRA
created the Minnesota Forest Resources Council to implement the
GEIS mitigation strategies, and that SFRA required DNR to
182
monitor mitigation compliance.
According to MPCA, the
environmental groups failed to offer databases or modeling
183
technologies superior to those in the GEIS.
MEPA expressly
requires the use of generic EIS information in project-specific
environmental review, MPCA argued, and does not require an
184
RGU “to conduct studies endlessly.”
In a thoughtful opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court. Recognizing that DNR was “deeply divided on the
issue of whether to recommend the preparation of an EIS,” the
court nevertheless found that MPCA acted appropriately in relying
“on the official opinion of the DNR submitted during the public
185
comment period.”
The court stated that requiring an
administrative agency to “look beyond the official comment issued
by another commenting agency” would “require a reviewing agency
to interject itself, we think improperly, into the internal debate of
186
the commenting agency.” The court also found that because the
EAW “target[ed] specific mitigation measures that have been or

180. Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 34-39, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
181. Id. at 22-31.
182. Id. at 32-34.
183. Id. at 21. As it argued in the district court, MPCA maintained that a
project-specific EIS for the Potlatch expansion would analyze the same United
States Forest Service FIA plots that the GEIS relied upon, and that “[t]here is
simply no evidence that a better database or modeling technology is available to
study the effects of increased timber harvesting from Potlatch’s expansion.” Id.
184. Id. at 12-13 (citing M INN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 8 (1995)) (requiring
project-specific environmental review to use the information and recommendation
in a generic EIS if EQB determines that the generic EIS “remains adequate at the
time the specific project is subject to review”).
185. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 216.
186. Id.
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will soon be implemented that address the environmental impacts
187
associated with the Potlatch expansion,” the mitigation measures
188
were more than “mere vague statements of good intentions.” In
addition, the court found that it was “questionable whether a
project-specific EIS would provide information substantially
189
different from or better than that contained in the GEIS.”
Ownership of the state’s forests “is divided among a wide variety of
groups,” and the “harvest of any timber stand depends on the
190
discretion of the specific landowner.”
As a result, the court
opined, “there does not appear to be any meaningful way to
identify the specific 7,600 acres of timberland likely to be harvested
from the 6,297,000 acres available for commercial timber
191
harvesting in the four-county Potlatch wood procurement zone.”
According to the court, the EQB prepared the GEIS precisely
because the effects of timber harvesting “could not be adequately
192
analyzed on a case-by-case, project-specific basis.”
The court
concluded that MPCA used the GEIS properly, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court denied the environmental groups’ petition for
review of the court of appeals’ decision.
4. Evaluating the Potlatch Decision
In Potlatch, the court of appeals offered a rational and wellconsidered discussion of the challenge to MPCA’s use of the GEIS.
The court found that substantial evidence in the administrative
record, which included the Potlatch EAW and the GEIS by
reference, supported MPCA’s decision not to require a projectspecific EIS. As a result, the court properly held that MPCA’s
actions were reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
There are, however, three significant flaws in the Potlatch
opinion. The first is the court’s declaration that “it is questionable
whether a project-specific EIS would provide information
substantially different from or better than that contained in the
193
GEIS.” Although the court’s conclusion was correct, use of the
187. Id. at 217.
188. Id. (citing Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res.,
531 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) and Audubon Soc’y v. Dailey, 977 F.2d
428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217.
190. Id. at 218.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 217.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
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term “questionable” does not accurately reflect the administrative
record. As the DNR’s official comments on the Potlatch expansion
explained, “[i]t is doubtful to expect that a site-specific EIS for this
project would produce substantially more insightful information on
cumulative timber and non-timber impacts and mitigations than is
194
contained in the GEIS.”
This was true in part because, as the
court recognized, it was impossible to identify the specific stands of
195
timber to be harvested as a result of the Potlatch expansion.
More significant, however, was the DNR’s conclusion that the GEIS
“provides an analysis of potential environmental effects and
anticipates applicable mitigations associated with harvest levels
196
encompassing the proposed Potlatch expansion.” In analyzing
the potential effects of timber harvesting and measures to mitigate
those effects, the GEIS evaluated the same information that the
MPCA and DNR would consider in conducting a project-specific
197
timber harvesting EIS for the Potlatch expansion.
The
administrative record, therefore, established that it was much more
than “questionable” whether an EIS would have provided different
or better information than the GEIS. Rather, the administrative
record reflected that an EIS on timber harvesting associated with
the Potlatch expansion would have duplicated the work and the
conclusions of the four-year, $875,000 GEIS.
The second flaw in the Potlatch opinion is the court’s failure to
analyze the “ongoing regulatory authority” component of
mitigation. According to the court, MPCA considered the extent to
which the environmental effects of the Potlatch expansion were
subject to mitigation in determining whether the Potlatch project
had the potential for significant environmental effects. However,
the court did not evaluate whether the environmental effects were
subject to mitigation “by ongoing public regulatory authority,” as
set forth in the EQB rules. In determining whether a project has a
potential for significant environmental effects, a governmental
entity may consider “the extent to which the environmental effects
are subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory
198
authority[.]”
MPCA argued that it complied with the rules
194. DNR Comment Letter (Respondent’s Appendix at A-1 to A-6, Potlatch, 569
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
195. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 218.
196. DNR Comment Letter (Respondent’s Appendix at A-1 to A-6, Potlatch, 569
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
197. See supra notes 169, 183 and accompanying texts.
198. M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (2001). See also supra note 31 and
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because it considered such mitigation. According to MPCA, SFRA
required the DNR—a state agency with ongoing regulatory
authority—to monitor the level of compliance with and efficacy of
199
the GEIS mitigation strategies.
The environmental groups
responded that under SFRA, the timber harvesting and forest
management guidelines are voluntary, and that voluntary
guidelines cannot constitute mitigation by ongoing public
200
regulatory authority. Although the parties briefed the issue in
detail, the Potlatch opinion did not discuss the matter. By
remaining silent, the court of appeals squandered an opportunity
to offer meaningful guidance regarding the use of the GEIS and
201
presaged a conflict that would resurface nearly five years later.
A third flaw in the Potlatch opinion is a factual error. In
discussing the environmental review process for the Potlatch
expansion, the court stated that “[b]ecause the MPCA has no
expertise in forestry and wildlife management, it delegated its
responsibility for evaluating the impact of increased timber
harvesting to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
202
(DNR).”
This language appears virtually verbatim in the
203
environmental groups’ appellate brief.
Use of the term
“delegation” to describe MPCA’s actions and DNR’s involvement is
factually incorrect. MPCA did not delegate responsibility for
making an EIS decision to DNR. Rather, as MPCA’s agenda item
and issue statement presenting the EAW to the MPCA Citizen’s
Board makes clear, “[D]uring the preparation of the EAW and the
responses to comments, the MPCA staff sought the assistance from the
DNR to review information submitted by Potlatch regarding timber
204
issues and to prepare responses to comments on these issues.”
accompanying text. Note that the EQB rules only require an RGU to consider
whether environmental effects are subject to mitigation by ongoing regulatory
authority in determining if a project has the potential for significant
environmental effects. The rules do not require that measures be subject to
“ongoing regulatory authority” to constitute “mitigation” under MEPA.
199. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Parts III. and IV.
202. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
203. See Appellants’ Brief at 4, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. C5-97-391) (“[t]he MPCA, although the RGU for the proposed expansion,
has no expertise in forestry and wildlife management, and therefore delegated
responsibility for evaluating the environmental effects of increased timber
harvesting to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.”).
204. MPCA Environmental Planning and Review Office, Potlatch Oriented
Strand Board Plant Expansion Issue Statement, Nov. 28, 1995 at 3 (Appellants’
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MPCA staff “gratefully acknowledge[d]” the “invaluable assistance
205
from the DNR staff members involved in this effort.” Rather than
characterizing MPCA’s decision to involve DNR as “delegation” to a
more knowledgeable agency, the Potlatch court and the
environmental groups should have praised MPCA staff for seeking
DNR’s assistance. In fact, the EQB regulations implementing
MEPA specifically allow such an interdisciplinary approach in EIS
206
preparation. Applying the same interdisciplinary principle to an
EAW constitutes good government, not “delegation.”
The Potlatch case has also been the subject of some
unwarranted criticism. One commentator recently criticized
Potlatch and Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range
207
Resources for the courts’ alleged unwillingness to conduct a
thorough review of administrative agency compliance with MEPA’s
208
procedural requirements.
According to the commentator,
Potlatch and Iron Rangers applied “the deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard” rather than the standard of review under the
209
Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”), resulting in
the courts’ failure to “make the distinct inquiry of whether the
210
agency followed proper procedure in making its determination.”
To prevent future purported lapses, the commentator advocates
that Minnesota courts conduct an invasive procedural and
substantive review of a governmental entity’s decision on the need
211
for an EIS.
The alleged justification for this novel standard of
review arises from MEPA’s broad policy goals, which the
212
commentator suggests establish substantive standards.
Appendix at A-238, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97391)) (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. See M INN. R. 4410.2200 (1995) (stating that “[a]n EIS shall be prepared
using an interdisciplinary approach[,]” that an RGU “may request that another
governmental unit help in the completion of the EIS[,]” and that another
governmental unit “shall assist in the preparation of environmental documents on
any project for which it has special expertise or access to information.”).
207. 531 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
208. Stacy Lynn Bettison, The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act:
The Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 26 WM.
M ITCHELL L. REV. 967, 1006 (2000) [hereinafter Bettison].
209. M INN. STAT. § 14.69 (2001).
210. Bettison, supra note 208, at 971.
211. Id. at 995-1006.
212. See id. at 999-1000 (stating that “[t]he substantive elements of MEPA can
be found principally in MEPA’s language directing state government to ‘use all
practicable means . . . to create and maintain conditions under which human
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A “procedural and substantive” standard of review for negative
EIS declarations is rooted in a fundamental misapprehension of
MAPA and MEPA. Contrary to the commentator’s assertions, there
is no distinction between the “deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard” and the standard of review for agency actions under
MAPA. Indeed, MAPA expressly provides that Minnesota courts
may reverse or modify an agency action if that action is “[m]ade
upon unlawful procedure . . . [u]nsupported by substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted . . . or [a]rbitrary
213
and capricious.”
Advocating an “in-depth evaluation of the
beings and nature can exist in productive harmony . . . ”) (citing M INN. STAT.
§ 116D.02 (2001)). Bettison errs in concluding that MEPA’s policy goals establish
a “substantive element.” MEPA Section 116D.02 contains language nearly
identical to the policy goals of NEPA Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2002), which
Bettison acknowledges does not establish enforceable standards of conduct and
does not create a cause of action. Bettison, supra note 208, at 969 n.8, and 9991000 n.181. Similarly, Minnesota courts have not transformed MEPA’s broad
policy goals into substantive standards. See supra note 20.
213. M INN. STAT. § 14.69(c), (e)-(f) (2000). As Bettison notes, the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), establishes a standard of
judicial review that is “essentially identical” to MAPA. Bettison, supra note 208, at
978, n.51. In reviewing agency decisions on the need for an EIS under NEPA,
federal courts apply the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, not an
anomalous “procedural and substantive” review. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-78 (1989) (noting that the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard is narrow, and that an agency must have the discretion to rely
on the “reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts” even if a court might not
make the same judgment); Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d
168, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Marsh and applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard in upholding an agency’s decision under MEPA to forego preparation of
an EIS after preparing an Environmental Assessment); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997) (if an agency has taken a “hard look” at
the possible environmental effects of a proposed action, its decision on the need
for an EIS is “a substantive question left to the informed discretion of the agency
proposing the action” and is subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir.
1995) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing an agency’s EIS
decision under MEPA to determine whether the agency “considered relevant
factors or made a clear error of judgment”); Audubon Soc’y of Cent. Ark. v.
Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 1992) (observing that an agency’s decision
whether to conduct an EIS “involves mixed questions of fact and law,” and holding
that federal courts “review[] agency treatment of such questions under the
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard”); North Carolina v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 957 F.2d 1125, 1128 (4th Cir. 1992) (in applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard to an agency’s EIS decision, “a court must consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment”); Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (an agency has “broad discretion” in
determining whether an EIS is necessary, “and the decision is reviewable only if it
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agency’s actions [under MEPA]” by employing a standard of review
that begins “as a procedural inquiry [and] ends as a substantive
214
one” in order to “reestablish the ‘action-forcing’ nature of
215
MEPA” is simply a clarion call for judicial activism. Minnesota
courts are capable of ensuring strict adherence to MEPA’s
procedures without employing a standard of review that invites the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the RGU. If an RGU
216
genuinely fails to comply with MEPA’s procedures, then its

was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion”). See also Daniel R. Mandelker,
NEPA LAW & LITIGATION §§ 8.6-8.7 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing arbitrary and
capricious standard of review under NEPA). Federal courts, therefore, defer to
“the informed discretion of responsible federal agencies” in examining
environmental review issues within an agency’s “technical expertise.” Marsh, 490
U.S. at 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)). A court
may not “substitute its own judgment for that of the agency,” Kleppe, 427 U.S. at
410 n. 21, or reject on substantive grounds an agency’s decision to proceed with a
project after environmental review is complete. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam). See also Hoffman, 132
F.3d at 14 (stating that “the ultimate scope of judicial review” of an agency’s
decision on the need for an EIS is “narrow,” and that “[t]he judiciary must not
interject itself into an area where the choice of action to be taken is one confided
by Congress to the executive branch”); North Carolina v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
957 F.2d at 1128 (observing that “the ultimate standard of review [of an agency’s
EIS decision] is a narrow one,” and that “the court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency”).
214. Bettison, supra note 208, at 1000-01.
215. Id. at 996. MEPA is not “action-forcing” and does not analyze the
substantive merits of a proposed project. Rather, environmental review under
MEPA is an information-gathering procedure designed to evaluate the
environmental consequences of a proposal that requires “major governmental
action.” See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Coon Creek Watershed
Dist. v. State Envtl. Quality Bd., 315 N.W.2d 604, 605 (Minn. 1982) (noting that an
EIS is an informational document that examines environmental consequences,
explores alternatives, and discusses mitigation measures); Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at
218 (“[e]nvironmental review is a process of information gathering and analysis”).
216. Bettison asserts that MPCA in Potlatch “failed to comply with the
procedures [of MEPA] on their face.” Bettison, supra note 208 at 1005. In
actuality, MPCA acted appropriately in relying upon the official opinion of DNR,
the agency with expertise in forestry and wildlife management. See supra note 185
and accompanying text. DNR determined that a project-specific EIS for the
Potlatch expansion would duplicate the GEIS by employing the same information
database and the same modeling assumptions to assess the effects of timber
harvesting. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. Note also that in
Potlatch, the parties agreed that the court of appeals should determine whether
MPCA’s decision not to conduct an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, or was
unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. Appellants’
Brief at 14-15, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391);
Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 10-12, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (No. C5-97-391).
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actions are arbitrary and capricious under MAPA and will be set
217
aside.
B. The EQB Considers the Status of the Timber Harvesting GEIS
As the parties were litigating the Potlatch case, Boise Cascade
Corporation approached MPCA with a proposal to expand its Kraft
218
pulp and paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota.
Boise
Cascade wanted to expand the facility to increase wood
consumption by 100,000 cords annually, to a total of 700,000 cords
219
per year. As with the Potlatch expansion, the EQB rules required
an EAW for the Boise Cascade project as a result of increased air
220
emissions.
MPCA, the governmental entity that the EQB rules
designate as the RGU for projects increasing air emissions by more
than 100 tons per year, again turned to DNR for assistance in
evaluating the environmental effects of increased timber harvesting
217. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Minn. Dept. of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903, 909
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Department of Agriculture’s decision not
to perform an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, where the Department of
Agriculture ignored DNR’s, MPCA’s, and the Department of Health’s
recommendations to conduct an EIS, failed to analyze potential environmental
effects, and assumed that monitoring or permitting would eliminate any
significant effects). Trout Unlimited considered whether the Department of
Agriculture’s decision on the need for an EIS complied with MEPA’s procedural
dictates, was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, and
was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 907-09. In Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464-65,
the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that determining the need for an EIS
under MEPA “is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the
agency’s technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented,” and that
Minnesota courts should “review the decision not to prepare an EIS for whether it
was unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted
or was arbitrary and capricious.” See infra Part IV.B.
218. Boise Cascade began the information gathering process for an EAW
regarding the expansion of its International Falls mill in September 1995.
Intervenor-Respondent Boise Cascade’s Brief at 4, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457
(Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96).
219. MPCA, Environmental Assessment Worksheet for Boise Cascade Pulp Mill
Efficiency Improvement and Boiler No. 2 Projects, International Falls, Minnesota,
at 20 (Feb. 17, 1999) (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-58,
Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) [hereinafter Boise
EAW].
220. See Boise EAW, supra note 219, at 1 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court
Appendix at R-39) Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96))
(noting that MPCA must prepare an EAW for the project under M INN. R.
4410.4300, subp. 15A, because the project was predicted to increase generation of
a regulated air pollutant emitted by the expanded facility by 100 tons or more per
year). See also supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the Potlatch
expansion).
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221

associated with the Boise Cascade expansion. DNR concluded
that the increased harvest “is of the type and extent envisioned in
the GEIS analysis,” and that it was “reasonable to infer that the
environmental consequences of this project, in terms of timber
harvest, do not differ substantially from the conclusions reached in
222
the GEIS.” Significantly, however, DNR stated that the GEIS did
223
not evaluate “landscape-level habitat fragmentation effects,” and
that “further research is necessary to identify how timber harvest
and forest fragmentation cumulatively effects the landscape-scale
224
distribution of habitat types over time.”
MPCA, with DNR’s
assistance, ultimately completed a 165-page EAW in February 1999
225
and circulated the document for public comment.
During the public comment period, MPCA received twenty-two
226
comment letters.
The most significant was a letter from the
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (“MCEA”), which
227
stated that the EAW had a “fundamental flaw.” MCEA noted that
the EQB rules allow “project-specific environmental review” to use
the information in a generic EIS “if the EQB determines that the
generic EIS remains adequate at the time the specific project is
228
subject to review.”
The environmental review rules, MCEA
correctly observed, require the EQB to determine that a generic
EIS is adequate for use in project-specific environmental review.
221. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, BCC International Falls Kraft
Pulp & Paper Mill Improvement Project, DNR Project Evaluation (Respondent
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-124 to R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d
457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
222. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, at 14 (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)
(No. C6-01-96)).
223. Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing “landscapelevel” and “site-level” effects).
224. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, at 14 (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)
(No. C6-01-96)).
225. MPCA North District Operations and Planning Section, Issue Statement,
Boise Cascade Efficiency Improvement Project, Feb. 22, 2000 at 2 (Respondent
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-196, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn.
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
226. Id.
227. Letter from James L. Erkel, Attorney and Forest Project Director,
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (“MCEA”), to Craig Affeldt,
Project Manager, MPCA 1 (Apr. 7, 1999) (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court
Appendix at R-188, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
228. Id. at 2 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-189, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)), citing M INN. R. 4410.3800,
subp. 8 (1999).
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MPCA and DNR could not rely on the GEIS in evaluating the Boise
Cascade project, MCEA maintained, because “[t]he EAW contains
no indication that EQB reached a determination that the [now five
year old] GEIS remains adequate for use in regard to assessing the
potential for significant environmental effects of the production
229
expansion at Boise Cascade’s mill.”
MCEA’s comment precipitated an MPCA inquiry to the EQB
regarding the ability to rely upon the GEIS in reviewing the Boise
230
Cascade project. The EQB responded that the environmental
review rules prohibited MPCA’s reliance on the GEIS until the EQB
231
determined that the study remained adequate. As a result, the
EQB would make an adequacy determination by following its
normal procedures—it would accept written and oral comments at
232
In making the
regularly scheduled EQB meetings.
determination, the EQB would evaluate whether there was
“substantial new information or new circumstances” since
completion of the GEIS in April 1994 that “may significantly affect
the potential environmental effects or the availability of prudent
233
and feasible alternatives with lesser environmental effects.”
The EQB accepted written comments regarding the continued
adequacy of the GEIS and conducted a public meeting at which it
234
received oral comments.
Persons challenging the continued
adequacy of the GEIS raised three issues. First, they criticized the
analytical model that the GEIS used to simulate timber harvests,
arguing that it overestimated tree growth and underestimated
235
environmental effects. Second, they maintained that the GEIS
employed assumptions regarding forest management and
236
mitigation that in practice had not been implemented. Third,

229. Id.
230. EQB Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re
Determination Whether the Timber Harvesting GIES Remains Adequate, Dec. 20,
1999, at 2 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-303, Boise Cascade,
644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) [hereinafter EQB GEIS Findings].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2-3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-303 to
R-304, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) (citing M INN.
R. 4410.3000, subp. 3.A (1999)).
234. EQB GEIS Findings, supra note 230, at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme
Court Appendix at R-304, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-0196)).
235. Id.
236. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/13

36

Lightfoot: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Minnesota Timber Harvesting
FINAL L IGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 10:51 PM

THE MINNESOTA TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS

473

they asserted that in 1995 the GEIS did not consider landscape237
level effects, even though such an analysis was possible as a result
238
of new timber harvest models.
Persons supporting the continued adequacy of the GEIS noted
that criticisms of the GEIS models did not constitute “substantial
new information;” the critique simply repeated earlier arguments
made prior to the EQB’s finding that the GEIS was adequate in
239
April 1994.
The GEIS supporters also disputed that too few
mitigation measures were in place, asserting that the industry made
“extensive” changes in timber harvesting techniques and
240
equipment since 1994. Regarding landscape-level effects, they
opined that the GEIS included landscape-level analysis and
geographical information even though it did not use the latest
241
models.
After weighing the arguments, the EQB in December 1999
concluded that the GEIS was “no longer as accurate as it was when
it was completed,” but was “still accurate enough if used,
interpreted, and qualified properly in project-specific
242
environmental review to adequately inform decision makers.”
The EQB declared that objections regarding the GEIS tree growth
model did not constitute substantial new information, because
EQB considered and dismissed the same argument in determining
243
that the GEIS was adequate in 1994. In addition, the EQB found
that the existence of new timber harvesting models did not
constitute substantial new information, because there was no new
244
data to include in the models. With respect to mitigation, the
237. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing “landscape-level
habitat fragmentation effects”).
238. EQB GEIS Findings, supra note 230, at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme
Court Appendix at R-304, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-0196)).
239. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
240. Id. at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-304, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
241. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-304, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
242. Id. at 5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-306, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
243. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
244. Id. The EQB found that the GEIS used the 1990 FIA forest inventory
database, and that the FIA database had not been updated since 1990. DNR and
the United States Forest Service began updating the FIA database in 1999, and
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EQB determined that the GEIS evaluated the consequences of
failing to implement mitigation; MPCA and DNR adjust that
information as appropriate in project-specific environmental
245
review. Finally, EQB stated that new models capable of mapping
the simulated results of timber harvesting on a landscape level did
not render the GEIS inadequate, because RGUs could employ such
246
models when needed on a case-by-case basis.
Shortly after the EQB determined that the GEIS remained
adequate, DNR recommended against an EIS for the Boise Cascade
project. According to DNR, the “potential effects of the project
itself to natural resources are minor, especially when considering
the scale of proposed increase, dispersed nature of related activity,
247
and the factors that govern timber markets in this state.”
In
arriving at its conclusion, DNR relied upon the GEIS and the
“ongoing implementation of programmatic mitigations authorized
248
under the Sustainable Forest Resources Act (SFRA).” DNR also
prepared a sixty-six page response to the EAW comments that
MPCA received on timber harvesting issues, which MPCA attached
249
to the Boise Cascade EAW.
Relying upon DNR’s
recommendation, MPCA issued a negative declaration on the need

would complete the update for the entire state in 2003. According to EQB,
“[u]ntil the new FIA data are available, any forestry modeling similar to what was
done in the GEIS will be based on the 1990 data.” Id. Although EQB could use
the 1990 FIA in the newer models and obtain results “likely [to] be more accurate
than those contained in the GEIS,” EQB found that such results “would be inferior
to those obtained by waiting until the new FIA data are available.” Id. In addition,
EQB found that “[i]f the GEIS analysis were done today with new models, it would
need to be updated again in 2003 because the new FIA inventory will constitute
substantial new information.” Id. (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix
at R-305, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
245. Id. at 4-5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305 to
R-306, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
246. Id. at 5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-306, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
247. Letter from Thomas W. Balcom, Supervisor, Environmental Review and
Assistance Unit, DNR, to Beth Lockwood, Supervisor, North District Operations
and Planning, MPCA 2, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants
MPCA and Boise Cascade Corp. at A73, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn.
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
248. Id.
249. DNR, Comments and Responses on Timber Harvest Issues, Proposed
Boise Cascade Corporation International Falls Mill Efficiency Improvement
Project EAW, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants MPCA and
Boise Cascade Corp. at A75-A143, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)
(No. C6-01-96)).
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250

C. The Boise Cascade District Court Opinion
On March 22, 2000, MCEA filed a complaint against MPCA in
Koochiching County District Court. The complaint alleged that
MPCA’s decision not to prepare an EIS for the Boise Cascade
251
project violated MEPA. Boise Cascade Corporation intervened,
252
and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
In support of its summary judgment motions and in
opposition to MCEA’s, MPCA advanced many of the same
arguments that it relied upon in Potlatch. MPCA urged the district
court to “carefully review” the Potlatch decision, “because the facts
and issues concerned timber harvesting effects that closely parallel
253
those pending in th[e] [Boise Cascade] case.” During the course
of environmental review, MPCA argued, it appropriately
considered the four criteria in the EQB rules for determining the
“potential for significant environmental effects.” MPCA also
maintained that it considered the type and extent of the Boise
proposal’s effects, and relied upon DNR’s conclusion that the
potential effects of the project were minor in the area where Boise
254
Cascade would secure additional timber.
Relying upon the
extensive discussion of cumulative timber harvesting effects in the
GEIS was appropriate, MPCA claimed, precisely because project255
specific review of such effects was impossible. MPCA also argued
that other environmental studies conducted under SFRA would
“anticipate and control” the environmental effects of timber
256
harvesting.
Finally, and most significantly, MPCA asserted that
the cumulative effects of timber harvesting were subject to
257
mitigation established by SFRA.
To implement the GEIS

250. MPCA Findings of Fact and Conclusions, In re Decision on the Need for
an EIS for the Proposed Boise Cascade Pulp and Paper Mill Efficiency
Improvement Project, Feb. 22, 2000 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court
Appendix at R-201 to R-213, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C601-96)) [hereinafter MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings].
251. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 462.
252. Id.
253. MPCA’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 27, Boise
Cascade (No. 36-C3-00-000173).
254. Id. at 34-35.
255. Id. at 29-33.
256. Id. at 38-42.
257. Id. at 35-38.
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mitigation measures, the legislature enacted SFRA and created the
Forest Resources Council. The EAW identified the mitigation
measures set forth in the GEIS and adopted by the Council, as well
as the implementation status of timber harvesting mitigation.
MPCA concluded that there was “substantial evidence in the
record . . . that the Council, the DNR, and others are carrying out
258
legislative mandates to implement the mitigation measures.”
Echoing its arguments in Potlatch, MCEA responded that the
GEIS had a “statewide and generic focus” that was inappropriate
for analyzing the project-specific effects of the Boise Cascade
259
expansion. MCEA also argued that the GEIS model assumptions
did not accurately reflect forest management policies and practices
260
in place when MPCA reviewed the Boise Cascade project. The
Potlatch case was distinguishable, according to MCEA, because the
mitigation measures relied upon by the court of appeals “have not
261
been fully implemented in the field.”
MCEA asserted that
MPCA’s reliance upon SFRA was inappropriate because the statute
did not “supersede MEPA,” and because the Minnesota Forest
Resources Council did not provide “ongoing regulatory authority”
sufficient to mitigate the environmental effects of increased timber
262
harvesting associated with the Boise Cascade project. According
to MCEA, the Council made policy only, and had no rulemaking,
permitting, or enforcement authority. As a result, MCEA
concluded that there was no reason to assume the Council’s
guidelines would reflect the GEIS mitigation measures, and no
mechanism to determine the extent of the guidelines’
263
implementation.
The district court granted MPCA’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that MPCA considered the four factors set forth
in EQB’s rules in determining that the Boise Cascade proposal did
264
not have a potential for significant environmental effects. The
court found that the EAW considered the potential type, extent,
and reversibility of any environmental effects of timber harvesting
258. Id. at 38.
259. MCEA’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Boise
Cascade (No. 36-C3-00-000173).
260. Id. at 22-25.
261. Id. at 25.
262. Id. at 26-27.
263. Id. at 27.
264. Boise Cascade, File No. 36-C3-00-000173 (Koochiching County Dist. Ct.
Nov. 15, 2000).
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likely to result from the Boise Cascade project. “MPCA analyzed an
enormous array of potential environmental impacts” relating to the
project, according to the court, and “devoted enormous attention
265
to the single issue—timber harvesting—contested by MCEA.” In
addition, the court held that MPCA considered the cumulative
potential effects of related or anticipated future projects, and “used
the information in the GEIS exactly as it is required to be used
266
under applicable rules.” MCEA’s objections to MPCA’s use of the
GEIS, the court opined, were identical to the comments MCEA
submitted to the EQB on the continued adequacy of the GEIS.
The EQB considered the criticisms but determined that the GEIS
remained adequate for MPCA’s use in evaluating the Boise Cascade
project. Because MCEA failed to appeal the EQB’s determination,
267
the court found the critique of the GEIS untimely.
Even
assuming MCEA’s attack on the GEIS was timely, the court held
that the arguments did not establish that MPCA failed to consider
268
the Boise Cascade project’s cumulative potential effects.
Regarding “mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority,”
the court first noted that proposed mitigation measures must be
269
“more than mere vague statements of good intentions.” Under
Minnesota law, MPCA could base its determination that the Boise
Cascade project did not have the potential for significant
environmental effect on mitigation measures that kept the effects
270
below a significance level.
The court found that it was not
arbitrary and capricious for MPCA to rely upon progress in
implementing mitigation under SFRA to address any potential
271
cumulative effects of timber harvesting identified in the GEIS.
Recognizing that the mitigation guidelines implemented under
SFRA are voluntary, the court nonetheless held that SFRA
constituted “an ongoing pubic regulatory authority” because “the
Legislature intended the [Minnesota Forest Resources Council] to
be the means by which to accomplish the mitigation recommended
272
in the GEIS.” SFRA ensures that “DNR, an agency with ongoing
regulatory authority will indeed monitor both the level of
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11 (citing Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881).
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13.
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273

compliance and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.” The
court concluded that MCPA acted reasonably, that the decision
against an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious, and that substantial
evidence in the administrative record supported MPCA’s judgment
on the Boise Cascade project.
IV. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS INEXPLICABLY IGNORED—BOISE
CASCADE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Arguments of the Parties
MCEA appealed the district court’s decision in Boise Cascade,
seeking reversal on three broad grounds: (1) that MPCA
improperly relied upon the GEIS; (2) that the timber harvesting
effects of the Boise project would not be addressed through
“ongoing public regulatory authority”; and (3) that the
274
recommended GEIS mitigation measures had not been adopted.
In particular, MCEA alleged that the Forest Resources Council’s
site-level timber management guidelines differed from the
275
mitigation measures assumed in the GEIS. In addition, MCEA
contended that SFRA’s programs did not constitute “ongoing
public regulatory authority” sufficient to obviate the need for a
276
project-specific EIS on timber harvesting.
Finally, MCEA
maintained that the district court erred in failing to identify the
specific mitigation measures in place and the efficacy of those
measures in addressing the potential environmental effects of the
277
Boise project.
MPCA countered that DNR, upon whose expertise MPCA
relied in determining that an EIS for the Boise project was
unnecessary, considered the specific effects of the project in the
278
context of other ongoing timber harvesting.
Regarding
mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority, MPCA argued
273. Id. at 14.
274. Appellant MCEA’s Statement of the Case at 6-7, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d
230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
275. MCEA’s Brief at 21-26, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
276. Id. at 35-41.
277. Id. at 30-35.
278. MPCA’s Brief at 19-29, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
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that DNR, Boise Cascade Corporation, and other public and
private forest owners were carrying out the Forest Resources
Council’s management guidelines, and that SFRA required DNR
279
and the Council to monitor implementation of the guidelines.
Accordingly, MPCA maintained that it was reasonable for the
agency to rely upon the guidelines to mitigate the effects of timber
harvesting associated with the Boise project. MPCA also contended
that Appendix E to the Boise EAW established that federal, state,
and local governments would apply the Forest Resources Council’s
guidelines to the majority of land that would provide timber for the
280
Boise project.
B. The Boise Cascade Court of Appeals Opinion
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
the record did not “adequately support” MPCA’s decision that “the
environmental impact of the Boise modification will not be such as
281
to require an EIS.” After declaring that the proper standard of
review was whether MPCA’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary,
282
or capricious, the court noted that an EAW is a document
283
designed to determine whether a project requires an EIS. The
court then recited the four factors that MPCA must consider in
determining whether the Boise project had the potential for
284
significant environmental effects such that an EIS was necessary.
Upon considering the four factors, MPCA must support its decision
on the need for an EIS with substantial evidence in the
administrative record. “Substantial evidence,” the court explained,
is “relevant evidence considered in its entirety that is more than
285
some evidence or a scintilla of evidence,” and is of a quality such
that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
286
conclusion.”
Embarking on its substantive analysis, the court focused on
279. Id. at 29-36.
280. Id. at 30-32.
281. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230, 232-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 644
N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
282. Id. at 234-35.
283. Id. at 235, quoting M INN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 24 (1999).
284. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235, quoting M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7
(1999).
285. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235.
286. Id. (quoting White v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 457 N.W.2d 724, 730
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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MCEA’s argument that the recommended GEIS mitigation
measures had not been adopted. Quoting the familiar standard
that “mitigation measures must be more than ‘vague statements of
287
good intentions,’” the court observed that “mitigation is an
important criterion to consider when determining the potential for
288
significant environmental impacts.” As a result, environmental
review documents must discuss mitigation “in sufficient detail to
ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly
289
evaluated.”
The GEIS identified many mitigation strategies to
address the environmental effects of timber harvesting, and the
court found that the state was implementing the measures “to some
290
extent.” However, the court stated that its review of the record
revealed most of the measures were still in the planning stages, and
the Boise EAW recognized that “[r]esearch beyond the scope of
this EAW” was required to address the certain cumulative timber
harvesting effects and to “apply the results [of such research] in
291
developing appropriate mitigation strategies.” The court opined,
therefore, that the efficacy of the mitigation measures for the Boise
Cascade project was “questionable” because:
A great number of the measures remain inchoate and
subject only to future monitoring; there are inaccuracies
in and omissions from the GEIS that require further
research and investigation; some of the conclusions in the
GEIS about mitigation are outdated; and none of the
mitigation
measures is assured because none is mandated
292
to occur.
As in Trout Unlimited, where the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture, in deciding that an EIS was unnecessary, simply
assumed that monitoring or permitting would eliminate any
293
significant environmental effects, the court found “substantially
lacking” any assurances “that reasonable mitigation measures will

287. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Iron Rangers for Responsible
Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
288. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235, citing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c)
(1999).
289. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236, quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain
v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
290. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236.
291. Id. (quoting Boise EAW, supra note 219).
292. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
293. 528 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See supra note 217.
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294

be in place before the harm is done.”
With respect to whether MPCA considered mitigation
295
measures “by ongoing public regulatory authority,” the court
stated that the Minnesota legislature enacted SFRA “ostensibly to
296
facilitate the implementation of the GEIS mitigation strategies.”
However, the court noted that the Minnesota Forest Resources
Council—the entity that SFRA created to implement the GEIS—
“does not truly perform a regulatory function” because compliance
297
with the guidelines is voluntary.
Without assurances that
“mitigation measures can be compelled,” the court concluded that
298
the potential for significant environmental effects would remain.
299
Finally, the court distinguished Potlatch, rejecting MPCA’s
300
argument that the case was the “mirror image” of Boise Cascade.
“Because we do not have before us the administrative record from
[Potlatch],” the court opined, “we cannot tell whether or not the
301
two cases are factually mirror images of each other.”
Nevertheless, the court found that unlike Potlatch, where the court
of appeals observed that the EAW targeted specific mitigation
302
measures “that have been or will soon be implemented,” the Boise
Cascade administrative record established that important mitigation
303
measures were not “beyond the guidelines or strategizing stage.”
In addition, it appeared to the court that “monitoring of the
compliance with and effectiveness of mitigation measures is
304
substantially lacking.”
C. Evaluating the Court of Appeals Opinion
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals in Boise
Cascade committed four serious errors. The court improperly
substituted its own judgment for that of the Minnesota legislature,
wrongly substituted its judgment for that of MPCA, failed to offer a
294. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237-38.
295. M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999).
296. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
300. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
303. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
304. Id.
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principled distinction of Potlatch, and erred in assuming that
measures must be required by regulation to constitute mitigation
under MEPA. Each of these omissions is discussed in detail below.
Perhaps the court’s gravest oversight was in substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature. According to the court,
although the legislature “ostensibly” enacted SFRA to implement
the GEIS mitigation strategies, the “voluntary” nature of the Forest
Resources Council’s guidelines imbued the measures with an
“evanescent quality” such that the court doubted mitigation would
305
be in place “before the harm is done.” In essence, the court of
appeals held that SFRA could not comply with the EQB rules
requiring MPCA to consider “mitigation by ongoing public
306
regulatory authority” because the Council’s guidelines were
voluntary.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals misconstrued
the EQB rules and utterly disregarded SFRA. As a result, the court
violated the doctrine that statutes embracing the same subject
matter should be construed to “harmonize with each other and
307
give full effect to all so far as this may reasonably be done.” In
addition, a court may not act as “a superlegislature to weigh the
308
wisdom of legislation” or evaluate the public policy merits of a
regulatory program to implement timber harvesting practices as
309
opposed to voluntary measures.
By criticizing the “voluntary”
nature of timber harvesting guidelines under SFRA and finding
that such guidelines could not constitute appropriate mitigation
under MEPA, the court of appeals exceeded the limited mandate
of judicial review and engaged in policy-making.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, the legislature’s
305. Id. at 237-38.
306. Id. at 235 (citing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999)).
307. Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 418, 77
N.W.2d 425, 428 (1956), quoting Comm’r of Highways v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 176
Minn. 501, 507, 223 N.W. 915, 917 (1929). See also No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at
323 n.30 (construing MEPA and the Power Plant Siting Act, and declaring that the
“general rule is that statutes covering the same subject matter should be construed
consistently”); State ex rel. Carlton v. Weed, 208 Minn. 342, 344, 294 N.W.2d 370,
372 (Minn. 1940) (“all statutes that relate to the same subject matter were
presumably enacted in accord with the same general legislative policy, and . . .
together they constitute an harmonious and uniform system of law.”); M INN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (2000) (providing that the “object of all interpretation and construction
of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,” therefore
“[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”).
308. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
309. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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enactment of SFRA was not “ostensibly” to implement the GEIS.
Rather, the legislature enacted SFRA precisely because the GEIS
310
suggested such a policy approach. The GEIS recommended that
the state establish a forest resources board to implement timber
311
harvest and forest management mitigation measures.
The
legislature responded by creating the Minnesota Forest Resources
312
Council under SFRA. Similarly, the GEIS recommended a forest
resources practices program to develop site-level timber harvest
313
and forest management practices, so the legislature required the
314
Council to develop such guidelines. Because the GEIS rejected a
“command and control” regulatory program as overly costly and
315
unnecessary,
the legislature decreed that forest practice
316
guidelines under SFRA would be voluntary.
The GEIS also
suggested that monitoring was necessary to determine compliance
with and efficacy of measures to mitigate the environmental effects
of timber harvesting, and that additional research was needed to fill
317
certain information gaps regarding Minnesota’s forests.
Accordingly, the legislature included extensive monitoring
318
programs in SFRA, and established a research advisory committee
319
to assess the “strategic directions in forest resources research.” By
310. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxxii-xxxiii.
311. Id.
312. M INN. STAT. §§ 89A.03, 89A.05-.06 (2000).
313. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxix-xxx.
314. M INN. STAT. § 89A.05 (2000).
315. See GEIS, supra note 10, at Appendix 4, 4-1 to 4-3 (“to help avoid costly
public and private steps,” the site-level forest management practices program
“should initially be voluntary”) and Appendix 4, 4-4 to 4-6 (“compliance [with
forest practices programs] is only slightly better where the regulatory practices are
mandatory and there is a thorough companion monitoring and compliance
enforcement program . . . and any regulatory program of this type can be costly to
both public agencies and private concerns.”). For example, California has what
the GEIS termed “a complex mandatory program.” Id. at Appendix 4, 4-5. See
generally Thomas N. Lippe & Kathy Bailey, Regulation of Logging on Private Land in
California Under Governor Gray Davis, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351 (2001)
(discussing California’s program regulating logging on private and state-owned
lands). The GEIS found that in 1991, administrative and enforcement
expenditures for California’s program exceeded $10 million annually. GEIS, supra
note 10, at Appendix 4, 4-6.
316. M INN. STAT. § 89A.05.
317. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxx-xxxi.
318. M INN. STAT. § 89A.07 (2000) (requiring DNR monitoring of broad forest
trends, compliance with the Council’s guidelines, and the effectiveness of the
Council’s guidelines and other efforts in addressing the environmental effects of
timber harvesting).
319. M INN. STAT. § 89A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
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emphasizing the EIS significance criterion related to the mitigation
of environmental effects by ongoing regulatory authority, the court
of appeals simply cast aside SFRA, the statute carefully designed to
implement the GEIS recommendations in the manner that the
GEIS suggested.
The court of appeals’ second major oversight involved
substituting its judgment for that of MPCA. According to the
court, the administrative record demonstrated that some mitigation
measures “have [not] gotten beyond the guidelines or strategizing
stage,” and that mitigation effectiveness monitoring was
320
“substantially lacking.”
Under SFRA, however, site-level
mitigation measures will never get beyond the “guidelines stage,”
because the Forest Resources Council’s guidelines are voluntary by
design. Even if MPCA prepared a site-specific EIS for the Boise
Cascade project, the voluntary nature of the timber harvesting
guidelines would remain unchanged. The court of appeals’
complaint that the measures will never be more than guidelines
rejects the legislature’s policy in enacting SFRA. Moreover, the
court of appeals’ conclusion that mitigation measures would not be
in place simply ignores the administrative record. The Boise EAW
includes a nearly forty-page appendix describing the
implementation status of mitigation measures promulgated by the
321
Forest Resources Council, DNR, and other public agencies. The
EAW also lists the mitigation measures that Boise Cascade
Corporation implemented to address the cumulative effects of
timber harvesting, including programs to ensure that the loggers
selling wood to Boise Cascade comply with the Forest Resources
322
Council’s voluntary guidelines and best management practices.
With respect to monitoring, DNR noted that the Council
approved a guideline implementation monitoring process and that
DNR was collecting field data on the effectiveness of the
323
guidelines.
DNR stated that it “is committed to meeting its
320. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
321. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix E (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-142 - R181, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
322. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix F (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme
Court Appendix at R-182 to R-184, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
323. DNR, Comments and Responses on Timber Harvest Issues, Proposed
Boise Cascade Corporation International Falls Mill Efficiency Improvement
Project EAW, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants MPCA and
Boise Cascade Corp. at A82-A83, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App.
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responsibilities, in conjunction with the broader [Forest Resources
Council], in providing the Legislature with the information
324
required under SFRA.” Accordingly, substantial evidence in the
administrative record supported MPCA’s conclusion that the
mitigation measures promulgated under SFRA were being
implemented as the GEIS and the legislature intended. By
articulating concerns regarding the implementation of timber
harvesting mitigation in light of the evidence in the record, the
court of appeals simply substituted its judgment for that of MPCA
rather than determining whether MPCA acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.
In holding that voluntary measures do not constitute
mitigation under MEPA, the court of appeals committed a third
major error. There is no requirement under MEPA that mitigation
measures be mandatory or subject to regulatory enforcement. On
the contrary, such measures need not be a permit condition or
even a contractual obligation for an agency to rely upon them in
determining whether a project has a significant environmental
325
effect.
As the United States Supreme Court has held, NEPA
simply requires that environmental review documents discuss
mitigation in “sufficient detail to ensure that environmental
consequences have been fairly evaluated,” but does not impose “a
substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually
326
formulated and adopted.” Similarly, the EQB rules require an
agency to consider the extent to which environmental effects are
327
subject to mitigation by ongoing regulatory authority —they do
not establish that a regulatory program is a prerequisite to MEPA
mitigation.
The court of appeals’ reliance upon Trout Unlimited is equally
328
inapposite. In Trout Unlimited, the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture decided not to require an EIS for a project under
MEPA after ignoring the recommendations of three other state
329
agencies that an EIS was necessary. In addition, the Department
of Agriculture failed to analyze any of the project’s potential
environmental effects, and merely assumed that future monitoring
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
324. Id. at A83.
325. Audubon Soc’y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992).
326. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989).
327. M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999).
328. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236-38.
329. Trout Unlimited, 528 N.W.2d at 907-09. See also supra note 217.
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330

or permitting would eliminate any significant effects. MPCA, in
contrast, evaluated the status of current and ongoing mitigation
efforts in determining that an EIS was unnecessary for the Boise
Cascade project, and relied upon DNR’s conclusion that the
project did not have a potential for significant environmental
effects. As a result, the court’s concern that MPCA’s actions were
in any way similar to those of the Department of Agriculture in
Trout Unlimited was unfounded.
Finally, in failing to offer a principled distinction of Potlatch,
the court of appeals committed a fourth mistake. According to the
court, it could not determine whether the Potlatch case was a
“mirror image” of the Boise Cascade litigation because the court did
331
not have access to the Potlatch administrative record. The court,
however, had access to the Potlatch opinion, as well as the
administrative record for MPCA’s decision regarding the Boise
Cascade project. In Potlatch, the court of appeals held that MPCA
properly relied upon the information in the GEIS in preparing an
EAW for a wood products facility expansion, and that “the EAW
and the GEIS provide and target specific mitigation measures to
332
reduce the impact of any adverse effects.” The GEIS that the
Potlatch court found targeted “specific mitigation measures” was the
same GEIS that MPCA relied upon in the Boise Cascade case. MPCA
determined just over one year after the GEIS was completed that
333
the Potlatch expansion did not require an EIS; the EQB found
that the GEIS remained adequate just a few months before MPCA
334
made its EIS decision on the Boise Cascade project. Like the
330. Id.
331. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
332. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217.
333. The EQB found the GEIS was adequate in April 1994. See generally GEIS,
supra note 10. MPCA issued its negative decision on the need for an EIS for the
Potlatch project in November 1995. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
334. See supra Part III.B. The court of appeals’ declaration that “there are
inaccuracies in and omissions from the GEIS that require further research and
investigation” is particularly troubling. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237. MCEA
submitted extensive comments as EQB evaluated whether the GEIS remained
adequate for use in evaluating the Boise project, see supra Part III.B., but did not
challenge the EQB’s decision that the GEIS remained accurate enough for
MPCA’s use. As a result, the adequacy of the GEIS was not before the court. In
addition, Appendix G to the Boise EAW, supra note 219 (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-185 to R-187, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)), specifically
identifies the statistical uncertainties present in assessing the effects of timber
harvesting, and explains how those uncertainties affect the environmental analysis.
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Potlatch EAW, the Boise Cascade EAW discussed specific
environmental effects likely to result from the project and
335
measures to mitigate those effects.
In fact, MPCA’s
administrative record for the Boise Cascade project documented
that implementation of the GEIS mitigation measures—which the
Potlatch court found adequate in 1997—had progressed
336
substantially since the court of appeals decided Potlatch.
Distinguishing Potlatch on the grounds that mitigation measures
were not being implemented, as the court of appeals suggested in
337
Boise Cascade, was at best unpersuasive.
V. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS RENEWED—BOISE CASCADE IN THE
SUPREME COURT
A. Arguments of the Parties
MPCA petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to review the
court of appeals’ decision in Boise Cascade because the intermediate
appellate court’s opinion “nullifies enacted legislative policies and
activities, contradicts on-point judicial precedent, and fails to apply
338
established judicial review standards.”
As a result, MPCA
339
maintained that the case fulfilled the requirements for review.
The supreme court agreed and granted MPCA’s petition.
In the supreme court, MPCA’s argument emphasized SFRA
and the voluntary guidelines promulgated by the Forest Resources
Council. Because the court of appeals believed “that the voluntary
mitigation measures enacted by the legislature in SFRA will not
work,” the court required that MPCA conduct a project-specific
Under the circumstances, it was improper for the court to suggest that the GEIS
was somehow “inaccurate.”
335. Potlatch EAW, supra note 129, at Attachment 4, 10-32 (Appellants’
Appendix at A-208 to A-230, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No.
C5-97-391)); Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendices B, C, D, and E
(Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-124 to R-181, Boise Cascade,
644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
336. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix E (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-142 to R-181 Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn.
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
337. Even Bettison, in criticizing the Potlatch decision, termed the Boise Cascade
district court litigation “a sort of ‘[Potlatch II]’ that revisits many of the issues in
[Potlatch].” Bettison, supra note 208, at 1005 n.219.
338. MPCA’s Petition for Review of Decision of Court of Appeals at 1, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6-01-96).
339. Id., citing M INN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117, subd. 2(a).
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340

EIS.
As a result, according to MPCA, the court of appeals
341
“eviscerated” SFRA and effectively substituted its judgment for
342
that of the agency. Because the legislature is “the ultimate public
regulatory authority,” MPCA’s discussion of the mitigation
measures promulgated under SFRA’s “carefully crafted legislative
scheme” satisfied MEPA’s requirement that a governmental entity
343
consider mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority.
MPCA also argued that the court of appeals’ decision “cannot be
reconciled” with Potlatch, where the same court held that voluntary
344
mitigation measures satisfied MEPA.
In addition, MPCA
maintained that it discussed timber harvest mitigation measures
even though MPCA and DNR “concluded in the first instance that
the Boise project will not cause significant effects because, simply,
345
the project is small.”
MCEA responded that MEPA, not SFRA, controlled MPCA’s
actions with respect to the Boise project. Given that the Forest
Resources Council does not perform a regulatory function, MCEA
argued that the court of appeals correctly found SFRA could not
346
compel implementation of the Council’s guidelines. As a result,
there were no assurances that “mitigation measures are in place
and effective,” and such voluntary mitigation did not comply with
347
MEPA. MCEA also maintained that MPCA did not conduct the
additional analysis that the EQB determined was necessary to rely
348
upon the GEIS in reviewing the Boise project. Finally, MCEA
alleged that “[t]he passage of time, the development of superior
analytical methods, and MPCA’s failure to impose real mitigation
requirements on Boise Cascade all differentiate” the case from
349
Potlatch.

340.
96).
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
01-96).
347.
348.
349.

MPCA’s Brief at 10, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6-01Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 21.
MCEA’s Brief at 20-25, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6Id. at 25, 33-39, 42-51.
Id. at 26-33.
Id. at 41-42.
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B. The Boise Cascade Supreme Court Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
holding that MPCA employed the GEIS appropriately under
MEPA. MPCA relied upon DNR in evaluating the environmental
effects of timber harvesting associated with the Boise project, and
DNR determined that the GEIS adequately discussed such effects.
With respect to mitigation, the supreme court held that the court
of appeals substituted its judgment for that of MPCA and DNR in
determining the implementation and effectiveness of the Forest
Resources Council’s guidelines.
Before analyzing the environmental issues, the supreme court
clarified the appropriate standard of judicial review in evaluating
agency decisions on the need for an EIS under MEPA. The court
stated that the “decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a
presumption of correctness, and deference should be shown by the
courts to the agencies’ expertise and their special knowledge in the
350
field of their technical training, education, and experience.”
According to the court, the legislature “codified the standard of
review for [an] agency’s decisions in contested case proceedings in
the Minnesota Administrative Procedures [sic] Act (MAPA) at
351
Minn. Stat. § 14.69.” Although MPCA’s EIS decision was not the
result of a contested case hearing, the court found MAPA’s
deferential standard of review appropriate because environmental
review involves the “application of an agency’s expertise, technical
352
training, and experience.”
Accordingly, the court reviewed
MPCA’s decision to determine whether it was “unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted or
353
was arbitrary and capricious.”
Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court easily
rejected MCEA’s argument that MPCA failed to conduct the
additional analysis necessary to rely upon the GEIS. The court
found that DNR stated that the Boise project was of the type
anticipated in the GEIS, and that MPCA properly relied upon
DNR’s expertise in determining a project-specific EIS on timber
harvesting was unnecessary. The court, therefore, deferred “to the
technical expertise of the MPCA and the DNR regarding the use
350. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 463 (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256
N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1988)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 464.
353. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

53

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 13
FINAL L IGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC

490

10/28/2002 10:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

354

and application of the Forestry GEIS.”
Mitigation issues proved more vexing. The court focused on
the requirement that MPCA consider, in determining whether the
Boise project had the potential for significant environmental effect,
the extent to which the project’s effects were “subject to mitigation
355
by ongoing public regulatory authority.”
According to the
supreme court, the court of appeals substituted its judgment for
that of MPCA and DNR on the need for an EIS. The court found
that substantial evidence in the administrative record supported
356
MPCA’s decision.
This evidence included confirmation that
DNR and the United States Forest Service, owners of approximately
one-third of the state’s forests, were actively implementing the
Minnesota Forest Resource Council’s guidelines, as were Boise
357
Cascade Corporation and many county governments. As a result,
the record confirmed MPCA’s conclusion that mitigation “will be
358
in place before any increased harvesting is undertaken.”
Turning to the “mandatory” or “voluntary” nature of
mitigation, the court declared that the parties’ focus on the
distinction was “somewhat misleading when the context of our
359
review of the MPCA’s decision is recalled.”
The EQB rules,
opined the court, merely require that MPCA consider the extent to
which ongoing public regulatory authority may mitigate a project’s
360
environmental effects. In making an EIS decision, MPCA could
361
review voluntary mitigation measures.
More importantly, the
court found that “the mitigation measures most relevant to this
case” were the timber harvesting guidelines that the Forest
Resources Council promulgated under SFRA, and that “the
362
legislature required that those guidelines were to be voluntary.”
Although it was “unable to find any requirement in our state’s
law that the MPCA cannot consider voluntary measures in assessing
363
mitigation,” the court found that MPCA did not rely solely upon
voluntary compliance with the Council’s guidelines. The Council

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 465 (citing Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824).
Id. (quoting M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (1999)).
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467 (citing Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 218).
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468 (citing M INN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999)).
Id.
Id. (citing SFRA, M INN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 3 (2000)).
Id.
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“may lack any statutory or administrative enforcement mechanism
or true regulatory authority,” but MPCA was capable of ensuring
“that reasonable mitigation measures will be in place when the
364
permit [for the Boise project] is issued.”
MPCA, the court
concluded, has the statutory authority to incorporate the Council’s
relevant timber harvesting guidelines into permits that MPCA
365
issues for the Boise project.
Justice Paul H. Anderson concurred in the majority opinion,
identifying a “weakness” that he perceived “in the majority’s
366
mitigation analysis.”
After a thorough review of the record,
Justice Anderson rightly concluded that the majority erred in
assuming that MPCA would include timber harvesting mitigation
measures in permits issued for the Boise Cascade project. MPCA
staff, Justice Anderson explained, stated in testimony on the Boise
EAW that the agency often includes measures to mitigate air and
water pollution as permit conditions, but it never incorporates the
367
Forest Resources Council’s guidelines into MPCA permits.
Justice Anderson acknowledged that the majority relied upon
timber harvest “mitigation measures implemented and enforced by
the United States Forest Service (USFS), the DNR, and certain
Minnesota counties,” and noted that MPCA’s discussion of such
measures constituted “more than a scintilla of evidence in the
record that the MPCA did, in fact, consider the extent to which the
effects of the project were subject to mitigation by ongoing public
368
regulatory authority.”
However, Justice Anderson observed
“MPCA did not address these measures as part of its specific
findings on mitigation and presumably did not base its final
369
decision on them.” Given MAPA’s deferential standard of review

364. Id. at 467.
365. Id. The court accurately observed that the Boise Cascade project would
require MPCA to amend the facility’s air operating permit under Title V of the
Clean Air Act, and to authorize construction of the modified facility under the
Clean Air Act’s prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) program. Id. at
467, n.9. Although the court states that MPCA would issue two permits, for such
modifications MPCA actually issues a single air emissions permit that consolidates
the PSD construction authorization and the authority to operate under Title V.
See MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings, supra note 250, at 11 (Respondent
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-211, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn.
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
366. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 469 (Anderson, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 470.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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Justice Anderson filed a concurring opinion rather than a dissent,
but expressed the hope that when deciding issues as important as
the Boise Cascade project “MPCA would provide a stronger basis
370
for its decision than was done here.”
C. Evaluating the Supreme Court Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Boise Cascade opinion
reiterates the proper role of judicial review under MEPA. Boise
Cascade reinforces the proposition that when an agency adheres to
MEPA’s procedural dictates, a court must affirm the agency’s
decision even though the court may have reached a different
371
conclusion.
Such judicial deference arises from constitutional
separation of powers principles that bar the legislature from
372
delegating administrative acts to the judiciary.
The supreme
court properly determined that the court of appeals ignored the
separation of powers doctrine and substituted its own judgment for
that of MPCA. Boise Cascade reinforces the “need for exercising
judicial restraint and for restricting judicial functions to a narrow
area of responsibility lest [the court] substitute its judgment for
373
that of the agency.”
Boise Cascade also reverses an outcome inconsistent with the
court of appeals’ decision on virtually identical facts in Potlatch.
Boise Cascade and Potlatch involved MPCA’s environmental review of
expansion proposals for wood products facilities in northern
Minnesota. In both cases, MPCA prepared EAWs and relied upon
DNR recommendations that project-specific environmental impact
statements on timber harvesting were unnecessary in light of the
GEIS. Both EAWs identified specific environmental effects and
374
mitigation measures. In Potlatch, the court of appeals found that
MPCA employed the GEIS properly and that the measures
implemented under SFRA constituted adequate mitigation for
370. Id. at 470-71.
371. See Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications
P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668-69 (Minn. 1984); First Nat’l Bank v. Dep’t of
Commerce, 350 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. 1984); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256
N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1988) (all holding that when an agency engages in
reasoned decision making, a court must affirm even though it may have reached a
different conclusion had it been the fact finder). The holding is consistent with
federal case law under NEPA. See supra note 213.
372. Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824.
373. Id. at 825.
374. See supra Part III.C.
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purposes of MEPA. The court of appeals’ Boise Cascade decision,
375
without offering a credible rationale to distinguish Potlatch, held
that MEPA required a project-specific environmental impact
statement to evaluate the effects of timber harvesting. By reversing
the court of appeals, the supreme court harmonized the two
decisions and provided valuable guidance on applying the GEIS in
conducting environmental review of specific projects. Moreover,
the supreme court’s decision may serve as a guide to other
governmental entities regarding the use of the timber harvesting
GEIS and other generic environmental impact statements that
376
address activities with regional or statewide effects.
The supreme court’s decision in Boise Cascade also is important
because it represents the court’s first attempt to construe SFRA. In
so doing, the court accurately declared that “the mitigation
measures most relevant to this case are the timber management
guidelines promulgated by the MFRC [Minnesota Forest Resources
Council] under the SFRA,” and that the legislature specified that
377
the guidelines were voluntary. The court’s careful attention to
the legislature’s intent in enacting SFRA is particularly appropriate
in the context of environmental review, given that the legislature
may pass project-specific measures that modify MEPA’s
378
procedures or altogether exclude projects from environmental
375. See supra Part IV.C.
376. The EQB rules require responsible governmental units to use the
information in a generic EIS in project-specific review under MEPA if the generic
EIS remains adequate at the time a specific project is subject to review. See supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text. The timber harvesting GEIS is currently the
only final generic EIS in Minnesota. The EQB is working to complete a generic
EIS on animal agriculture that will assess the statewide environmental effects of
animal feedlots. Final GEIS Policy Document Nearly Finished, GEIS UPDATE (Minn.
Envtl. Quality Bd., St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/eqb/geis/GEIS%20Update%20Jan%202002b.pd
f (last visited Aug. 6, 2002). The EQB also prepared a final scoping document for
a generic EIS on urban development in Minnesota, but the legislature has yet to
provide the EQB with funding to conduct that generic EIS. See M INNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL Q UALITY BOARD, FINAL SCOPING DOCUMENT, GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STUDY ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN M INNESOTA
(2000),
available
at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/eqb/pdf/UDGEISScopingDocFinal.PDF
(last
visited Aug. 6, 2002). Telephone Interview with George Johnson, GEIS Project
Manager, Environmental Quality Board (Aug. 6, 2002).
377. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 467.
378. See In re Am. Iron & Supply Co., 604 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (Minnesota legislature passed a statute requiring that MPCA conduct an
EAW on a metal shredding facility to determine whether an EIS was necessary,
even though the project did not meet or exceed a mandatory EAW threshold
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379

review.
In addition, Boise Cascade is significant because it confirms that
the standard of review under MAPA applies to agency decisions
even if an agency does not hold a contested case proceeding.
MAPA section 14.69, which the supreme court construed,
380
establishes the “scope of judicial review” for “contested cases”
381
under sections 14.63 through 14.68.
MPCA’s decision on the
need for a project-specific EIS did not involve a contested case, but
the supreme court concluded that MAPA’s standard of review
nonetheless applied on the grounds of separation of powers.
382
Quoting Reserve Mining, the supreme court declared it was a
“bedrock separation of powers principle that the legislature may
not delegate to the courts duties which are essentially
383
administrative in character.” Because environmental review
requires agencies to apply technical expertise, the court found
384
MAPA’s standard of review appropriate.
At least one court of
appeals decision involving environmental review relied upon
385
MAPA, but Boise Cascade appears to be the first decision in which
the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly states that MAPA applies
to decisions by responsible governmental units under MEPA.
under M INN. R. 4410.4300).
379. See supra note 45.
380. As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized, a “contested case” is a
proceeding before an administrative agency “in which the legal rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be
determined after an agency hearing.” M INN. STAT. § 14.02, subd. 3 (2000). See also
Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 n.8. A contested case hearing is an adversarial
proceeding before an administrative law judge, with the right of the parties to
cross-examine witnesses and offer rebuttal evidence. M INN. STAT. § 14.60, subds. 14 (2000). During the proceeding, the administrative law judge receives probative
evidence, applies privileges recognized by law, and may exclude evidence on the
grounds that it is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious. Id. at subd.
2.
381. M INN. STAT. § 14.69 (2000) (stating that in a judicial review under section
14.63-.68, the court may affirm the agency decision, remand the case for further
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision).
382. 256 N.W.2d at 824.
383. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
384. Id.
385. See In re Univ. of Minn., 566 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
MAPA as the applicable standard of review in evaluating whether the university
violated MEPA procedure by entering into a contract that might prejudice the
ultimate decision on a project before determining that a final EIS was adequate).
Bettison mistakenly concludes that the Minnesota Court of Appeals has never
relied upon MAPA “in the environmental review setting.” Bettison, supra note
208, at 981-82.
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Although the opinion provides useful guidance on the
standard of review under MEPA and the use of the GEIS, the
majority in Boise Cascade errs in asserting that MPCA permits could
incorporate timber harvesting mitigation measures. As Justice
Anderson correctly observes in his concurring opinion, MPCA has
never incorporated timber harvesting mitigation measures into the
386
agency’s permits.
Staff testimony before the agency’s Citizen
Board during the Boise Cascade environmental review process also
387
suggests MPCA has no intention of instituting such a practice.
Integrating the Forest Resources Council’s voluntary timber
management guidelines into air or water permits would exceed
MPCA’s statutory mandate. MPCA’s authority extends to meeting
“problems related to water, air and land pollution in the areas of
388
the state affected thereby . . .” DNR’s powers and duties entail
the “charge and control of all the public lands, parks, timber, waters,
minerals, and wild animals of the state and the use, sale, leasing, or
389
If MPCA incorporated timber
other disposition thereof . . .”
harvesting and forest management guidelines into a permit
regulating air emissions or water discharges, the agency would
surpass its grant of authority from the legislature and encroach
upon DNR’s powers. Under MAPA, an agency that exceeds its
390
statutory jurisdiction acts unlawfully.
Of equal importance, an MPCA permit that includes the
Forest Resources Council’s guidelines as regulatory directives is
inconsistent with SFRA. The Minnesota legislature could have
adopted a command and control regulatory program, complete
with a permit system and judicial enforcement, in response to the
GEIS. Instead, the legislature adhered to the policy
recommendations of the GEIS and enacted SFRA, a statute
authorizing the promulgation of voluntary timber management
guidelines. Including the Council’s voluntary guidelines as
386. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 470 (Anderson, J., concurring).
387. See id. (quoting a member of MPCA’s environmental review staff stating
that “we have not advocated carrying those [timber harvesting guidelines] over
into permits”).
388. M INN. STAT. § 116.01 (2000).
389. M INN. STAT. § 84.027, subd. 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
390. M INN. STAT. § 14.69(b) (2000). See also Cable Communications Bd. v.
Nor-West Cable Communications P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn.
1984)(stating that “[a]gencies are not permitted to act outside the jurisdictional
boundaries of their enabling acts”); Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd., 171 N.W.2d 712, 715
(Minn. 1969)(stating that an appellate court may reverse an agency decision
“where it appears the agency has not kept within its jurisdiction”).
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enforceable terms in MPCA permits is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent that SFRA embodies. Such conduct would also
run counter to the state’s regulatory policy, which declares agencies
must avoid “overly prescriptive and inflexible” programs that
increase “costs to the state, local governments, and the regulated
community and decreas[e] the effectiveness of the regulatory
391
program.”
Justice Anderson’s concurring opinion offers cogent and
persuasive analysis in all but one respect. The opinion incorrectly
declares that MPCA “presumably did not base its final decision on”
the timber harvesting mitigation measures implemented and
enforced by the United States Forest Service, DNR, and Minnesota
392
county governments. MPCA failed to specifically articulate in its
mitigation findings on the Boise EAW that it was relying upon
393
implementation of such measures. However, Appendix B to the
394
Boise EAW, which MPCA’s findings reference, notes that the
entities committed to meeting or exceeding the Forest Resources
Council’s guidelines own approximately seventy-five percent of the
timber estimated to provide the additional wood for Boise
395
Cascade’s project. The administrative record, therefore, clearly
establishes that MPCA considered United States Forest Service,
DNR, Boise Cascade Corporation, and county implementation of
timber harvesting mitigation in determining that a project-specific
EIS was unnecessary. Justice Anderson accurately observes that
MPCA’s findings could have been more explicit, but the
391. M INN. STAT. § 14.002 (2000).
392. 644 N.W.2d at 470.
393. See MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings, supra note 250, at 9-11 (Supreme
Court Appendix of Respondent MCEA at R-209 to R-211, Boise Cascade, 644
N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) (stating that the cumulative effects of
timber harvesting are subject to “ongoing implementation of programmatic
mitigation measures authorized under the Minnesota Sustainable Forest
Resources Act,” and referencing findings that discuss SFRA).
394. Id. at 10 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-210 Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
395. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B at 8 (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-131, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)
(No. C6-01-96)). The entities include Boise Cascade Corporation, estimated to
own twenty-three percent of the wood; the United States Forest Service, estimated
to own eight percent; DNR and other state agencies, estimated to own twenty-four
percent, and county governments, estimated to own twenty percent. Private
sources own the remaining twenty-five percent. Id. Because individual owners
may sell to loggers who implement the guidelines, in excess of seventy-five percent
of the wood harvested for the Boise Cascade project may be cut by loggers
complying with the Council’s forest management practices.
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administrative record contradicts the assertion that MPCA failed to
rely upon evidence documenting statewide implementation of
396
timber harvesting mitigation measures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state of Minnesota spent nearly five years and $875,000 in
assessing the cumulative effects of timber harvesting in the GEIS.
In Potlatch, the court of appeals reviewed the first application of the
GEIS to project-specific environmental review and held that MPCA
used the GEIS as envisioned in MEPA. The second application of
the GEIS, however, proved more problematic. Ignoring Potlatch
and the intent of the legislature, the court of appeals in its illconceived Boise Cascade decision held that MPCA’s application of
the GEIS violated MEPA, and that the Boise project required an
environmental impact statement on timber harvesting despite the
state’s extensive earlier study and the EQB’s decision that MPCA
must use that study in analyzing the Boise project.
As this article demonstrates, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rectified the court of appeals’ error by reversing that court’s Boise
Cascade decision, and holding that the administrative record
supported MPCA’s decision not to require an environmental
impact statement. In so doing, the Minnesota Supreme Court
employed the correct judicial review standard, and reaffirmed the
court of appeals’ analysis in Potlatch. Despite the inaccuracies in
the majority’s opinion and Justice Anderson’s concurrence, the
Boise Cascade decision offers essential insights on the application of
the GEIS. It should serve as an effective guide for MPCA and other
governmental entities in evaluating future projects under MEPA.

396. See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text. See also Boise Cascade, 644
N.W.2d at 466 (stating that “the record indicates that the DNR and the United
States Forest Service (USFS), who own approximately one-third of all forested land
in Minnesota, are actively implementing mitigation measures,” and “[t]he record
also indicates application of similar measures on certain county and federal
lands”).
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